Sugya Context Index

One entry for every passage the author cites, in the order of the Shas: Mishnah and Bavli together, tractate by tractate through the six Orders; then the Yerushalmi, the halachic midrashim and Bereshit Rabbah; then the verses of Scripture in the order of the books. Each entry is written from the Sefaria text of the passage itself — the Mishnah and the Talmud, with Rashi or Bartenura where they are needed to identify the scene — and not from any translation of this book. It gives the quoted words, the scene, the question at issue, the moves around the quoted words, the people with their generation and school, the realia a lay reader needs, and one sentence on what the author uses the passage for. The chapter numbers in parentheses point back into the book. Where the author's wording differs from the printed Talmud, or where the folio he gives does not carry the words, the entry says so.

Seder Zera'im

Berachot 2a (ch. 8; ch. 11) — Quoted: "From when does one recite the Shema in the evening?" (מאימתי קורין את שמע) and the Gemara's opening question, "On what does the Tanna stand?" (תנא היכא קאי). This is the first mishnah of the Talmud: the evening Shema may be recited "from the hour the priests enter to eat their terumah" (nightfall, when priests who immersed by day become clean to eat the priestly portion) "until the end of the first watch" according to R. Eliezer (ben Hyrcanus, Tanna of the second generation, Yavneh); the Sages say until midnight; Rabban Gamliel, the Nasi, until dawn. The Gemara's first difficulty is one of order: the Tanna asks "from when" as though the duty itself were already established, and it further asks why the evening is taught before the morning. The answer is that the Tanna stands on the verse "when you lie down and when you rise." The author uses the opening question in ch. 8 as the model objection to the arrangement of a report, and the mishnah's "from when" in ch. 11 as the aspect of time.

Berachot 4a (ch. 9) — Quoted: "R. Yaakov bar Idi set [two verses] against one another: it is written 'Behold, I am with you and I will guard you wherever you go' (Genesis 28:15), and it is written 'And Jacob was very afraid' (Genesis 32:8). He said: perhaps sin will cause it" (שמא יגרום החטא). The sugya asks how David could call himself pious and yet pray to be kept; the answer is that even the righteous fear that a later sin may forfeit a promise, and the proof is Jacob, who had God's promise at the ladder and still feared Esau. R. Yaakov bar Idi is an Amora of the Land of Israel of the second–third generation, in the circle of R. Yochanan. The author uses the passage as his example of an apparent contradiction between two verses (רמיא) and of its true settlement (ישוב).

Berachot 10b (ch. 11, twice) — Quoted: "In the evening every person should recline and recite, and in the morning he should stand" (בערב כל אדם יטה ויקרא ובבקר יעמוד). The mishnah records the dispute of the schools: Beit Shammai read "when you lie down and when you rise" (Deuteronomy 6:7) as prescribing the body's position, reclining at night and standing by day; Beit Hillel read "when you walk by the way" and let each person recite as he is. The author cites Beit Shammai's rule twice, once for the aspect of posture and once for the aspect of time.

Berachot 15a (ch. 2; ch. 11) — Quoted: "'One who recites' — after the fact, yes; from the outset, no" (הקורא, דיעבד אין, לכתחלה לא), and the mishnah's "one who recites the Shema" (הקורא את שמע). The mishnah rules that one who recited the Shema without making it audible to his own ear has fulfilled the duty, while R. Yose says he has not. The Gemara, seeking the Tanna who holds that a deaf man's separation of terumah is valid only after the fact, proposes that this could be R. Yehudah, since the mishnah is worded "one who recited" — a past participle, implying that only after the fact is the recitation valid; the Gemara then rejects the proof, explaining the wording as chosen to show the force of R. Yose's stricter view. R. Yehudah (bar Ilai) and R. Yose (ben Chalafta) are Tannaim of the fourth generation, the leading students of R. Akiva; Rav Chisda and Rav Mattana, who identify the Tanna, are Babylonian Amoraim of the third generation. The author uses the inference from the participle in ch. 2 as an example of a foundation engraved in the nature of language, and "one who recites the Shema" in ch. 11 as a voluntary action.

Berachot 20b (ch. 3; ch. 6; ch. 9, twice) — Quoted: Rav Adda bar Ahavah's statement (ch. 3, 6); 1742 ch. 9 prints "R. Eliezer said:" for the same words — Sefaria: "Rav Adda bar Ahavah said: women are obligated in the sanctification of the day by Torah law" (נשים חיבות בקדוש היום דבר תורה); the mishnah "one who had a seminal emission contemplates [the Shema] in his heart" (בעל קרי מהרהר בלבו); and "Ravina said: this is to say that contemplation is like speech" (הרהור כדבור דמי). Kiddush is a positive commandment bound to a time, from which women are normally exempt; the Gemara asks why they should be obligated, Abaye answers that the duty is rabbinic, Rava objects that Rav Adda said "by Torah law," and the resolution is that whoever is bound by "keep" the Shabbat is bound by "remember" it. The mishnah of the בעל קרי rests on Ezra's decree that a man made impure by a seminal emission not engage in Torah until he immerses; Ravina infers from his being told to contemplate the Shema that thought counts as speech, while Rav Chisda draws the opposite inference (if it counted, he would be forbidden to think it). Rav Adda bar Ahavah is a Babylonian Amora of the second generation, a student of Rav; Ravina is a late Babylonian Amora of the generation of Rav Ashi. The author uses Rav Adda's statement as his model statement — subject "women," predicate "obligation" — and as the unqualified statement with categorical force (ch. 3), for the ultimate intention of a simple statement (ch. 6) and as the model firsthand statement (ch. 9); Ravina's remark is his model inference (ch. 9).

Berachot 22a (ch. 9) — Quoted: "R. Yehoshua ben Levi said: what is the nature of those who immerse in the morning?" (מה טיבן של טובלי שחרין), and the Gemara's restatement, "this is what he is saying: what is the nature [of immersing] in forty se'ah, when nine kav suffice? what is the nature of immersion, when pouring suffices?" The Gemara objects that R. Yehoshua ben Levi himself holds that a man after a seminal emission may not study until he immerses, so he cannot be asking why they immerse; it therefore reads his terse question as a question about the manner: Ezra's decree can be met by pouring nine kav of drawn water, so why the full ritual bath of forty se'ah? R. Yehoshua ben Levi is an Amora of the Land of Israel of the first generation (Lod). The author uses the restatement as his example of an explanation (פירוש) that spells out a statement's intent.

Berachot 2 / 26a (ch. 9) — 1742 cites ברכות ב' for "With what are we dealing here?" (הכא במאי עסקינן). The formula does not occur on Berachot 2a–b (2a has תנא היכא קאי, a different objection). On Berachot 26a it occurs three times: twice in the sugya on how far one must be from a privy to pray — Rav Chisda's ruling that one may pray facing a privy is squared with the rule of distance by "with what are we dealing here? with a privy that has no filth," and then "with a new one, never yet used" — and once when R. Yitzchak in the name of R. Yochanan limits a baraita denying any remedy for an omitted prayer to "one who omitted it deliberately." The author cites the formula as the mark of an אוקימתא, an explanation that leaves a statement's words as they are and restricts its case.

Berachot 24b (ch. 9) — Quoted: "They taught this only where he is able to direct his heart in a whisper" (לא שנו אלא שיכול לכוין את לבו בלחש). A baraita calls one who prays aloud "of little faith"; Rav Huna limits it: where he cannot concentrate silently he may raise his voice, though not in a congregation, where he would disturb others. Rav Huna is a Babylonian Amora of the second generation, head of the academy of Sura. The author cites "they taught this only" as a second formula of the אוקימתא.

Berachot 35a (ch. 9) — Quoted: "How does one recite blessings over fruits?" (כיצד מברכין על הפרות). The mishnah that opens the sixth chapter answers its own question: over fruit of the tree "who creates the fruit of the tree," except wine; over fruit of the ground "who creates the fruit of the ground," except bread; over vegetables R. Yehudah distinguishes "kinds of herbs." The author cites the question as a query (שאלה) about the manner of a thing.

Berachot 35b (ch. 11) — Quoted: "Whatever is primary and has something secondary with it" (כל שהוא עיקר ועמו טפלה). The rule is the mishnah's (Berachot 6:7): one blesses over the primary food and thereby exempts the secondary. It is cited in the Gemara's discussion of olive oil — if the oil is eaten by dipping bread in it, the bread is primary and the oil secondary, so no separate blessing is said over the oil. The author uses it for the attribute that is found together with the subject at one time.

Berachot 51b (ch. 11) — Quoted: "One washes the hands and afterwards mixes the cup" (נוטלין לידים ואחר כך מוזגין את הכוס). The mishnah lists the disputes of the schools about a meal: Beit Shammai wash the hands first and then mix the cup (dilute the wine with water); Beit Hillel mix first and wash afterwards. The Gemara traces the dispute to the laws of purity of liquids on the outside of a cup. The author uses Beit Shammai's order for the attribute of what comes before and after.

Berachot 53a (ch. 5) — Quoted: "If the majority are Israel, he blesses" (אם רוב ישראל מברך); the inference "hence half and half he does not bless"; and the answer, "by right even half and half he blesses, but since the first clause taught 'a majority of gentiles,' the second taught 'a majority of Israel'" (איידי דתנא רישא). A baraita rules that one walking outside a town at the close of Shabbat who sees a light may bless over it for havdalah only if the town is mostly Jewish (a light kindled by gentiles on Shabbat may not be used). The Gemara notes that the two clauses yield contradictory inferences for a town half and half, and resolves that the second clause merely mirrors the first. The author uses it as a non-necessary inference, drawn by first reflection and then set aside.

Berachot 58b (ch. 8, twice) — Quoted: "And we have it by tradition that it does not pass Kesil" (וגמירי דלא עבר כסלא); "but we see that it passes!" (והא קא חזינן דעבר); "it is its radiance that passes" (זיוה הוא דעבר). The mishnah lists "zikin" among the sights over which one blesses "whose strength and might fill the world"; Shmuel explains zikin as a comet and adds that the paths of the heavens are as familiar to him as the streets of Nehardea, except the comet, and that by tradition a comet never crosses the constellation Kesil (Orion) — were it to do so the world would be destroyed. To the objection that comets are seen crossing it, the Gemara answers that only the comet's glow crosses. Shmuel is a Babylonian Amora of the first generation, head of Nehardea and an astronomer. The author uses the exchange twice: as a disproof from sense and as the rebuttal of that disproof (the sense does not in fact contradict the statement).

Mishnah Peah 7:4 (ch. 11) — Quoted: 1742 "What is a kolelet?" (איזהו כוללת); Sefaria: "What is an olelet?" (איזוהי עוללת). Any [cluster] that has neither a shoulder nor a pendant. The verse "you shall not glean (תעולל) your vineyard" (Leviticus 19:10) leaves the defective clusters to the poor, and the mishnah defines them. Bartenura: the "shoulder" is the small clusters lying one on another along the central stem like a load on a man's shoulder; the "pendant" is the grapes hanging down at the tip; a cluster with neither is an olelet, and in doubt it belongs to the poor. The author uses the mishnah as his example of a definition (גדר).

Mishnah Demai 1:2 (ch. 3; ch. 6) — Quoted: "And one may redeem it, silver for silver, copper for copper, silver for copper, and copper for produce, provided that he again redeem the produce" (ובלבד שיחזר ויפדה את הפרות). Demai is produce bought from an ordinary person (an am ha-aretz) who may not have tithed it; its second tithe is treated leniently, and this clause allows the second-tithe money of demai to be exchanged in ways not allowed for certain second tithe. The proviso is R. Meir's; the Sages hold that once copper is exchanged for produce, the produce itself must be brought up to Jerusalem and eaten there. Bartenura notes a reading "and he may again redeem" for the proviso. Second tithe is the tenth eaten in Jerusalem, or redeemed for coin that is later spent there. The author uses the clause as his example of a conditional statement, the kind that carries a proviso (ch. 3), and for its two intentions, of which the proviso can fail while the rule stands (ch. 6).

Mishnah Demai 4:4 (ch. 3) — Quoted: "And if a priest or a poor man were accustomed to eat with him, they may come and eat" (ואם היו כהן או עני למודים לאכל אצלו יבואו ויאכלו). One who has designated the terumat ma'aser of demai or the poor-tithe of certain produce may not hand them over on Shabbat, since gifts to a priest or to the poor are not given on Shabbat; but a priest or poor man who regularly eats at his table may eat them there, provided he tells them what they are eating (Bartenura). The author uses the clause as his example of a hypothetical statement, with "if a priest or poor man were accustomed" as antecedent and "they may come and eat" as consequent.

Mishnah Demai 6:1 (ch. 3) — Quoted: "One who receives a field from an Israelite, from a gentile or from a Samaritan divides [the produce] before them" (המקבל שדה מישראל, מן הנכרי ומן הכותי – יחלק לפניהם). The מקבל is a sharecropper who works a field for a share of the crop; he divides the crop before the owner and need not tithe the owner's share, a leniency Bartenura explains as meant to keep men willing to take fields on shares. The one who rents for a fixed quantity (חוכר) must separate terumah before paying. The author uses the clause as one predicate asserted of three subjects, a simple compound statement.

Mishnah Demai 6:5 (with 6:3) (ch. 3) — Quoted: "Just as they divide the non-sacred produce, so they divide the terumah" (כשם שחולקין בחלין כך חולקין בתרומה). Mishnah 6:3 says this of a priest or Levite who takes an Israelite's field on shares; Mishnah 6:5 says it of "one who receives olive trees for oil," and adds R. Yehudah's dissent that an Israelite who takes olives from a priest or Levite for half the profit leaves the tithes to the owners. Bartenura: in 6:5 the tenant took trees, not land, which the Rabbis did not treat like land. The author's own gloss two sentences later, "one who receives olives for oil," is the wording of 6:5; he uses the clause as his example of a comparative statement, in which a known case (the division of the non-sacred) settles an unknown one.

Mishnah Kilayim 5:5 (ch. 11, twice) — Quoted: "He renders forbidden sixteen cubits in every direction" and "he renders forbidden forty-five vines" (הרי זה מקדש שש־עשרה אמה לכל רוח; הרי זה מקדש ארבעים וחמשה גפנים). One who plants or keeps a vegetable in a vineyard makes the surrounding vines forbidden as mixed kinds of the vineyard (Deuteronomy 22:9): forty-five vines when the vines stand four or five cubits apart, and a circle of sixteen cubits' radius when they stand six or seven apart. Bartenura works out the geometry of the circle of thirty-two cubits' diameter. The author uses the two figures for the aspect of quantity, as measure and as number.

Mishnah Kilayim 8:1 (ch. 3, twice) — Quoted: "Mixed kinds of the vineyard are forbidden to be sown and to be kept, and are forbidden as to benefit" (כלאי הכרם אסורין מלזרוע ומלקים ואסורין בהנאה), and "they are permitted as to eating, and all the more so as to benefit" (ומתרין באכילה וכל שכן בהנאה), said of mixed kinds of seeds. The mishnah sets the four kinds of kilayim side by side: of the vineyard (forbidden in every way, and burned, from "lest it be forfeit," Deuteronomy 22:9), of seeds (forbidden to sow and keep, but the produce may be eaten), of garments (forbidden only to wear), of animals (forbidden only to crossbreed). The author uses the first clause as several predicates of one subject, a simple compound, and the second for the order "this, and needless to say this," where the novel case precedes the obvious one.

Mishnah Shevi'it 9:2 (ch. 11) — Quoted: "Upper Galilee, Lower Galilee, and the valley" (גליל העליון, גליל התחתון, והעמק). For the removal (ביעור) of Sabbatical-year produce the Land is divided into three lands — Judea, Transjordan and Galilee — and each into three regions; in Galilee, from Kfar Chananya upward, where sycamores do not grow, is Upper Galilee, below it Lower Galilee, and the district of Tiberias is the valley. The author uses the division for the aspect of parts.

Mishnah Terumot 1:7 (ch. 3) — Quoted: "They may not separate terumah by measure, nor by weight, nor by number" (אין תורמין לא במדה ולא במשקל ולא במנין). Terumah, the portion given to the priest, has no fixed Torah measure and is to be separated by estimate; Bartenura derives this from "and your gift shall be reckoned to you" (Numbers 18:27) — reckoned in thought, not measured. One may separate it from produce already measured, and may use a measuring basket only when it is not filled. The author uses the clause as three predicates denied of one subject, a simple compound.

Mishnah Terumot 11:5 (ch. 3) — Quoted: "He must not let the rest go to waste, but rather he should put it in a concealed place" (לא יאבד את השאר אלא יניחנו במקום מצנע). The mishnah closes a list of what parts of terumah produce are forbidden to non-priests with the case of one who sifts a kav or two of fine flour from a se'ah of terumah wheat (a se'ah is six kav): the coarse remainder is still food, so discarding it would be destroying terumah (Bartenura); he must store it away. The author uses the clause as his example of a preclusive statement — one predicate affirmed together with the denial of another.

Mishnah Ma'asrot 2:1 (ch. 3; ch. 6) — Quoted: "If one was passing through the market and said, 'Take figs for yourselves,' they may eat and are exempt; therefore, if they brought them into their houses, they must tithe them as certainly untithed" (אוכלים ופטורים, לפיכך אם הכניסו לבתיהם מתקנים ודאי). Produce becomes fixed for tithing when it is brought into the house, or by sale, but not by gift; the giver, an ordinary person not trusted about tithes (Bartenura), gave a little to be eaten on the spot and did not tithe it, so a snack in the market is free, but once the figs enter a house they must be tithed as certainly untithed, not merely as demai. If he said "take and bring them into your houses," no casual eating is allowed and at home they are tithed only as demai. The author uses the first clause as his example of a consequent statement, a predicate that follows from another (ch. 3), and for its three intentions — the antecedent, the consequent and the dependence, all asserted (ch. 6).

Mishnah Ma'asrot 5:8 (ch. 3) — Quoted: "Even though their parent is terumah, these may be eaten" (אף על פי שאביהן תרומה, הרי אלו יאכלו). The mishnah exempts from tithes certain wild-growing foods and the seeds of garden plants that are not themselves eaten — leek seed, onion seed, turnip and radish seed — and adds that the plants grown from such seed may be eaten even if the seed was terumah. Bartenura: "their parent" is the seed, the parent of what grows from it; growths of terumah count as terumah only when the seed sown is itself a food. The author uses the clause as his example of a statement of discrepancy, where the subject carries a predicate that seems to contradict the one asserted.

Mishnah Ma'aser Sheni 1:2 (ch. 3) — Quoted: "The firstborn — they may sell it: unblemished, alive; and blemished, alive and slaughtered" (הבכור מוכרין אותו: תמים חי, ובעל מום חי ושחוט). The mishnah contrasts animal tithe, which may not be sold at all nor used to betroth a woman, with the firstborn animal, which is the priest's property and may be sold, unblemished only alive (its blood and fat go to the altar and its meat is eaten in Jerusalem) and blemished even slaughtered; Bartenura: the firstborn "may not be redeemed" (Numbers 18:17), but it may be sold. The author uses the clause for the order "not only this but even this," where the obvious case (sold alive) precedes the novel one (sold slaughtered).

Seder Mo'ed

Shabbat 2a (ch. 11) — Quoted: "The carryings-out of Shabbat are two, which are four, inside, and two, which are four, outside" (יציאות השבת שתים שהן ארבע בפנים, ושתים שהן ארבע בחוץ). The first mishnah of Shabbat counts the cases of the labor of transferring between a private and a public domain: two Torah-level transfers, out and in, each doubled into a liable and an exempt case, from the standpoint of the person inside and of the person outside. The author uses the count as his model of a good division, into two parts and then each into two.

Shabbat 5b–6a (ch. 10) — Quoted: "Where do we find a case like this in which one is liable?" (היכא אשכחנא כהאי גוונא דחייב); "Rav Safra said that R. Ami said that R. Yochanan said: it is just as with one who carries an object through the public domain" (מידי דהוה אמעביר חפץ ברשות הרבים); "Are they comparable? There, wherever he sets it down is a place of liability; here, if he sets it down in the colonnade, it is a place of exemption" (מי דמי). A baraita rules that one who carries from a shop (a private domain) to a plaza (a public domain) by way of a colonnade (סטיו, a covered walk, which the Gemara classes with the karmelit, a domain that is neither) is liable, and that Ben Azzai exempts him, since he holds that walking is like standing still, so the object came to rest in the colonnade. The Gemara asks what precedent the Rabbis have for liability where an exempt stretch lies between lifting and setting down; R. Yochanan's answer is the carrier in the public domain, exempt while walking and liable when he sets down, and the Gemara rejects the comparison and tries two more (four cubits in the public domain; the sides of the public domain) on 6a. Ben Azzai is a Tanna of the third generation, at Yavneh; R. Yochanan is the head of the academy of Tiberias in the second generation of Amoraim, R. Ami his student, and Rav Safra a Babylonian Amora of the third–fourth generation who travelled between the two lands. The author uses the exchange as the worked example of a chain of statement, proof and proof of the proof, which he unfolds in full in ch. 10.

Shabbat 19a (ch. 9) — Quoted: "R. Tzadok said: such was the custom of the house of Rabban Gamliel" (כך היה מנהגו של בית רבן גמליאל). The mishnah forbids handing work to a gentile too close to Shabbat, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel reports that his father's house gave white garments to the gentile launderer three days before Shabbat; the baraita quoted adds R. Tzadok's report that colored garments were given even on Friday, from which the Gemara learns that white cloth is the harder to launder. R. Tzadok is a priest and Tanna of the Temple's last years and of Yavneh, in Rabban Gamliel's circle. The author uses the sentence as his example of a report (הגדה) of an incident or practice.

Shabbat 28b (ch. 4) — Quoted: "R. Eliezer says: it is impure, and one may not light with it; R. Akiva says: it is pure, and one may light with it" (טמאה היא ואין מדליקין בה; טהורה היא ומדליקין בה). The mishnah concerns a piece of cloth folded into a lamp-wick but not yet singed: R. Eliezer holds that folding does not undo its status as a garment, so it can still contract impurity and may not be lit on Shabbat; R. Akiva holds that folding annuls the garment. R. Eliezer (ben Hyrcanus) is a Tanna of the second generation and R. Akiva of the third. The author uses the pair as diametrically opposed statements about a single subject.

Shabbat 40b (ch. 11) — Quoted: "that the hand recoils from it" (שהיד סולדת בו). A baraita permits placing a jug of cold water near the fire on Shabbat to take off its chill but not to heat it; the Gemara asks about oil, and Rabbah and Rav Yosef hold that the first Tanna permits oil even to the point "that the hand recoils from it," since oil is not subject to the prohibition of cooking, while Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak holds the opposite. "The hand recoils" is the Talmud's standard measure of what counts as hot. The author uses the phrase for the aspect of affection, an impression made on a subject by another.

Shabbat 43b (ch. 7) — Quoted: "moving from the side" (טלטול מן הצד). A corpse lying in the sun on Shabbat may not be moved directly, being set aside from use (muktzeh); Rav Yehudah in Shmuel's name says one rolls it from bed to bed, Rav Chanina bar Shelamya in Rav's name says one lays a loaf or an infant on it and carries it. Where no loaf or infant is at hand, Rav holds that indirect moving is still "moving" and Shmuel holds that it is not, and the Gemara ties the dispute to a pair of Tannaim on rescuing a corpse from a fire. The author uses the case in ch. 7: one who had concluded that a muktzeh object may not be moved even from the side must drop the conclusion on hearing that indirect moving is not called moving.

Shabbat 57a (ch. 4, twice) — Quoted: "A woman may not go out with a totefet or with sanbotin" (1742: סנבוטין; Sefaria, Shabbat 57a: סרביטין) (לא תצא אשה לא בטוטפת ולא בסרביטין), and "nor with a kavul" (ולא בכבול). The mishnah that opens the sixth chapter lists ornaments a woman may not wear into the public domain, lest she take one off to show a friend and carry it; the totefet is a forehead ornament and the sarbitin are pendants hanging beside the face, and they are forbidden "when they are not sewn" to her head-covering, while the kavul, a woolen head ornament, is forbidden "into the public domain." The permissions the author sets against them — sewn totefet and sarbitin, and the kavul "in a courtyard" — are the mishnah of 6:5 later in the chapter. The author uses the pairs as statements that are not opposites, because they speak of different times (sewn or not) and different places (public domain or courtyard).

Shabbat 70a (ch. 7) — Quoted: "R. Yose says that it is not a primary category of labor" — in the Gemara's words, "kindling was singled out for a mere prohibition, the words of R. Yose; R. Natan says: it was singled out to divide" (הבערה ללאו יצאת). The sugya asks how we know that each of the thirty-nine labors carries its own liability; R. Natan derives it from the separate prohibition of kindling (Exodus 35:3), singled out from the general prohibition to teach that every labor is counted separately, while R. Yose holds that kindling was singled out to be a mere prohibition — punishable, unlike the other labors, by neither stoning nor excision. Shmuel follows R. Yose. The author uses R. Yose's view in ch. 7: the syllogism "whoever performs a primary labor is liable to death; kindling is a primary labor" yields no conclusion once one hears that kindling is not, for R. Yose, a primary labor.

Shabbat 73a (ch. 7; with Sanhedrin 53a) — Quoted: the premise that "one who performs a primary category of labor on Shabbat is liable to stoning." The mishnah of Shabbat 7:2 lists the primary labors, "forty less one," from sowing and plowing through writing two letters, kindling, and carrying from domain to domain; the Gemara asks why they are counted and answers with R. Yochanan that one who did them all in one lapse of awareness is liable for each. The liability to stoning is from the mishnah of Sanhedrin 7:4, which lists "one who desecrates Shabbat" among those stoned. The author uses the two together as the premise of his first classical syllogism.

Shabbat 76b (ch. 4) — Quoted: "and they combine with one another, because they are equal in their measures, except for their shells" (ומצטרפין זה עם זה מפני ששוו בשעוריהן חוץ מקלפיהן), and "R. Yehudah says: except for the shells of lentils" (חוץ מקלפי עדשים). One who carries out food on Shabbat is liable at the bulk of a dried fig, and different foods combine to that bulk; the first Tanna excludes their shells, seeds, stems and bran from the count, and R. Yehudah adds that the shells of lentils do count, because they are cooked and eaten with the lentils. The author uses the pair as contradictory but not diametrically opposed statements: the first Tanna's is categorical (all shells), R. Yehudah's particular (lentil shells), and R. Yehudah concedes the rest.

Shabbat 82a (ch. 8) — Quoted: R. Meir's proof from "to rake fire from a hearth" (Isaiah 30:14) and R. Yose's reply, "From there is the proof! — 'and to draw water from a pool'" (משם ראיה). The mishnah asks how large a shard of earthenware one must carry out to be liable: R. Yehudah says enough to set between two boards, R. Meir enough to rake a fire with, R. Yose enough to hold a quarter-log. R. Meir cites the prophet's curse that among the fragments of the smashed vessel there will be found no shard "to rake fire from a hearth"; R. Yose answers that the same verse continues "or to draw water from a pool," so the verse itself treats the water-holding shard as the significant one. R. Meir and R. Yose are Tannaim of the fourth generation. The author uses the reply as his example of turning the opponent's proof into one's own.

Shabbat 101b (ch. 11) — Quoted: "a sword is like the slain" (חרב הרי הוא כחלל). The sugya concerns ships tied together, and Shmuel's requirement of an iron chain for a tent of a corpse to convey impurity from one ship to another; the Gemara explains that from "one slain by the sword" (Numbers 19:16) the Sages derived that a metal implement touching a corpse takes on the corpse's own grade of impurity, whereas for Shabbat any cord that holds is enough. The author uses the rule for the aspect of similarity.

Shabbat 106a, with Beitzah 24a (ch. 5) — Quoted: "R. Yehudah says: one who traps a bird into a closet, or a deer into a house, is liable" (הצד צפור למגדל וצבי לבית חייב), and the Gemara's inference at Beitzah 24a, "it is into a house that he is liable, but into enclosures, no" (לבית הוא דמחייב אבל לביברין לא). The mishnah of Shabbat 13:5 defines the labor of trapping: for R. Yehudah a bird is trapped only when driven into a cupboard and a deer only when driven into a house, while the Sages count a garden, a courtyard or an enclosure as trapping a deer. Beitzah 24a draws the inference from R. Yehudah's wording to explain why, in his view, an animal already in an enclosure is not yet caught and may not be taken from it on a festival. The author uses the inference as his first example of a diyuk: a subject limited to "into a house" excludes what lies outside the limit.

Shabbat 124a (ch. 4) — Quoted: "All vessels may be taken for a purpose and not for a purpose; R. Nechemyah says: they may be taken only for a purpose" (כל הכלים נטלין לצורך ושלא לצורך; רבי נחמיה אומר: אין נטלין אלא לצורך). The mishnah concerns moving utensils on Shabbat; the Gemara has Rabbah and Rava define "for a purpose" (for the vessel's own use, or for the use of the place it occupies) and "not for a purpose" (for example, from sun to shade), and R. Nechemyah forbids even a vessel of permitted use except for its own use or its place. R. Nechemyah is a Tanna of the fourth generation, a student of R. Akiva. The author uses the pair as diametrically opposed statements, both categorical.

Eruvin 75b (ch. 11) — Quoted: "ten houses, one within the other" (עשרה בתים זה לפנים מזה). Rav Yehudah in the name of Shmuel rules that where ten houses open one into the next, so that the inner residents pass through the outer houses to reach the courtyard, the innermost house alone contributes to the courtyard's eruv (the shared food that joins the courtyard's households for carrying on Shabbat), the outer houses counting as its gatehouses; R. Yochanan requires the second-innermost as well. The author uses the case for the aspect of place.

Eruvin 87b (ch. 11) — Quoted: "two balconies, one above the other" (שתי גזוזטראות זו למעלה מזו). The mishnah rules that from a balcony over water one may not draw water on Shabbat through an opening unless a partition ten handbreadths high surrounds it, and that where two such balconies stand one above the other and only the upper was given a partition, both are forbidden to draw until they join in an eruv. The author's second example under this citation, "two towns, one adjacent to the other," does not stand on 87b; the nearest source is the rule that two towns within 141⅓ cubits of each other are given a karpef and counted as one (Mishnah Eruvin 5:2, at 55b and 57a). The author uses both for the aspect of place.

Eruvin 102b (ch. 4) — Quoted: "and if he drove it in, he is liable to a sin-offering" (ואם תקע חייב חטאת). A baraita on the hinge-pin of the door of a chest, box or cupboard: the lower pin may be replaced in the Temple and only pushed back elsewhere, the upper may not be replaced anywhere, a decree lest one drive it home — "and if he drove it in (תקע), he is liable to a sin-offering," for building. The author uses the sentence to show that תקע, "to drive in," and תקיעה, "the blowing" of the shofar, are the same word in different senses, so that the two rulings are not opposites.

Pesachim 4b (ch. 2) — Quoted: "This 'all are believed' — it should have said 'all houses are presumed to have been searched'" (האי הכל נאמנים, כל הבתים בחזקת בדוקים מבעי לה). The sugya asks whether a house has a presumption of having been searched for leaven on the fourteenth of Nisan, and tests it against a ruling that "all are believed regarding the search, even women, slaves and minors" — people whose word does not ordinarily count. If the ruling rested on the presumption, the Gemara objects, it would have been worded as a presumption about the houses, not as a matter of believing anyone. The author uses the objection in ch. 2 as a difficulty founded on the natural sense of a form of words.

Pesachim 5b (ch. 7) — Quoted: "Learn from this: kindling was singled out to divide" (שמע מנה: הבערה לחלק יצאת). From R. Akiva's view that leaven can be destroyed only by burning the Gemara draws three lessons, among them that the separate prohibition of kindling on Shabbat (Exodus 35:3) was singled out to divide the labors, each carrying its own liability, and not, as R. Yose holds, to make kindling a mere prohibition. The author uses it as his example of the disjunctive syllogism: kindling was singled out either to divide or as a mere prohibition, and the second is ruled out.

Pesachim 7b (ch. 3; ch. 10) — Quoted: "There, how should we say it? Should we say 'to circumcise'? Must it necessarily be he who circumcises?" (התם היכי נימא? נימא למול – לא סגיא דלאו איהו מהיל); "The father of the son — what is there to say?" (אבי הבן מאי איכא למימר); "Yes, it is indeed so" (אין הכי נמי). Rav Pappi and Rav Pappa, Babylonian Amoraim of the fifth generation, dispute the wording of the blessing over destroying leaven, "to destroy" or "concerning the destruction" — whether the form "concerning …" refers to an act already done. Against the view that it does, the Gemara raises the blessing at a circumcision, "concerning the circumcision," which is said before the act; it answers that no other wording was possible there, since the one who circumcises is usually not the child's father, who alone bears the duty and could say "to circumcise"; it asks what the father himself says, and concedes that he says "to circumcise." A parallel objection from "concerning the slaughter" follows, and the sugya closes with the ruling "concerning the destruction of leaven." The author uses the exchange in ch. 3 as his model of reducing a brief, rhetorical utterance to the statements it intends, and again in ch. 10 for the same procedure.

Pesachim 9b (ch. 3; ch. 6) — Quoted: "Since a marten and a polecat are found there, they certainly dragged it away at that very time" (כיון דחלדה וברדלס מצויים שם – ודאי גררוהו בההיא שעתא). R. Yehudah's baraita tells of the maidservant of a violent man in the town of Rimon who threw a stillborn child into a pit; a priest came and looked in to see whether it was male or female, and the Sages declared him clean of corpse-impurity because martens and polecats frequent the place and would certainly have dragged the body off at once. The Gemara uses the story against Rava's rule that a doubt does not override a certainty, and answers that here certainty stands against certainty. The author uses the sentence as his example of a qualified statement asserted by way of certainty (ch. 3) and shows in ch. 6 that its truth hangs on the certainty being real.

Pesachim 14b (ch. 11) — Quoted: "What is the thing whose impurity differs between the impurity of a corpse and that of a creeping thing? Say: it is metal" (איזהו דבר שחלוקה טומאתו בין טומאת מת לשרץ? הוי אומר זה מתכת). R. Akiva's testimony in the mishnah speaks of a lamp made impure by one impure through a corpse, and Rava explains why the Tanna chose that case rather than the more common creeping thing: only a metal vessel, which takes on the grade of what it touches, becomes a primary source of impurity from a corpse-impure person, so the lamp must be metal. The author uses the question for the aspect of the bearer — asking to what subject an accident belongs.

Pesachim 16a (ch. 9) — Quoted: "R. Elazar says: there is no impurity for liquids at all! Know it, for Yosei ben Yo'ezer of Tzereidah testified concerning the eil kamtza that it is clean, and concerning the liquids of the slaughterhouse that they are clean" (אין טומאה למשקין כל עיקר, תדע שהרי העיד יוסי בן יועזר איש צרידה). The baraita denies that liquids are impure by Torah law and proves it from the testimony recorded in Eduyot 8:4: that a certain locust is permitted, and that the liquids of the Temple slaughterhouse are pure — a rabbinic decree of impurity, the argument runs, was simply not applied in the Temple. Yosei ben Yo'ezer is one of the "pairs" who headed the Sanhedrin in the second century BCE; the R. Elazar of the baraita is a Tanna. The author uses the "know it" as his example of a demonstration (הוכחה).

Pesachim 17a (ch. 10) — Quoted: "the liquids of the slaughterhouse are clean" (משקי בי מדבחיא דכן) and "the blood, the wine, the oil and the water are pure" (הדם והיין והשמן והמים טהורים). Rav and Levi differ on the scope of Yosei ben Yo'ezer's testimony — Rav says the liquids of the slaughterhouse, Levi the liquids of the altar — and on whether "clean" means truly pure or only unable to convey impurity; a baraita in Levi's favor names the four altar liquids that became impure inside the Temple and were carried out, ruling them pure. The author uses the two wordings in ch. 10 as synonymous statements, one naming the genus and the other its species.

Pesachim 17b (ch. 9) — Quoted: "Rav Pappa said: even according to the one who says that the impurity of liquids is by Torah law, the liquids of the slaughterhouse are learned as a received halachah" (הלכתא גמירי לה), and Rav Huna son of Rav Natan's reply: "but that which R. Eliezer said, 'there is no impurity for liquids at all; know it …' — if it is a received halachah, can we derive from it?" A received halachah is a tradition handed to Moses at Sinai, and no general rule is derived from such a tradition; so if the purity of the slaughterhouse liquids were one, R. Eliezer's proof from it would collapse. Rav Pappa is a Babylonian Amora of the fifth generation (Naresh); Rav Huna son of Rav Natan of the sixth. The author uses the reply as his example of a direct contradiction (סתירה) that annuls a statement by demonstration.

Pesachim 19a (ch. 7) — Quoted: "And if it should enter your mind that he holds like R. Akiva, let him also teach fourth-degree impurity in terumah and fifth-degree in consecrated food" (ואי סלקא דעתך סבר כרבי עקיבא, נתני נמי רביעי בתרומה וחמישי בקדש). Impurity passes down in grades — first, second, third — and R. Akiva derived a third grade even in non-sacred food, while R. Yose derived a third grade in consecrated food by an a fortiori argument. The Gemara argues that if R. Yose accepted R. Akiva's view he would have extended his own argument to a fourth grade in terumah and a fifth in consecrated food; since he did not, he does not hold like R. Akiva. The author uses the argument as his example of the hypothetical syllogism, denying the consequent to deny the antecedent.

Pesachim 19b (ch. 8) — Quoted: "Rav Ashi said: that is to say, the Temple courtyard is a public domain" (עזרה רשות הרבים היא). The mishnah records a needle found in sacrificial meat, where the meat is impure but the priest's hands and the vessels are clean; Rav Ashi infers that for the law of doubtful impurity the courtyard counts as a public domain, where a doubt is judged clean. Rav Ashi heads the academy of Sura in the sixth generation of Babylonian Amoraim. The author uses the statement in ch. 8 to show that a predicate asserted in one aspect (impurity) cannot serve a conclusion in another (Shabbat, where the courtyard is a private domain).

Pesachim 22a and 22b (ch. 11) — Quoted: "Blood is different, since it is juxtaposed to water" (שאני דם דאתקש למים), and "a limb from a living animal is different, since it is juxtaposed to blood" (שאני אבר מן החי דאתקש לדם). R. Abbahu holds that wherever the Torah says "you shall not eat," benefit is forbidden as well; the Gemara objects that blood is forbidden to eat yet the Temple's blood was sold to gardeners as fertilizer, and answers that blood is different, being likened to water in "you shall pour it out on the earth like water" (Deuteronomy 12:24); it objects again from the limb of a living animal, which may be thrown to dogs, and answers that it is likened to blood in the same passage. R. Abbahu is an Amora of the Land of Israel of the third generation (Caesarea). The author uses the two answers for the aspect of difference.

Pesachim 50a (ch. 11) — Quoted: "One who goes from a place where they do not work to a place where they do" (ההולך ממקום שאין עושים למקום שעושים). The mishnah that opens the fourth chapter makes work on the eve of Passover before midday depend on local custom, and rules that one who travels between places of different custom bears the stringencies of both. The author uses the traveller for the aspect of movement.

Pesachim 50b (ch. 5) — Quoted: "There is one who is diligent and rewarded" (יש זריז ונשכר). A baraita distinguishes the diligent man who is rewarded — he works all week and not on Friday afternoon — from the diligent man who loses (works Friday afternoon too), the idle man who is rewarded and the idle man who loses. The author uses the first clause as a partial affirmative statement and draws from it its three inferences, including "there is one who is diligent and not rewarded."

Pesachim 74a (ch. 11) — Quoted: "if part of it is hot, all of it is hot" (חם מקצתו חם כלו). The mishnah has the Passover offering roasted on a spit of pomegranate wood; the Gemara asks why not a metal spit and answers that metal heats through, so the meat would be roasted by the spit rather than "roasted in fire" as the Torah requires; other woods are rejected because they exude moisture. The author uses the phrase for the aspect of affection.

Pesachim 76b (ch. 11) — Quoted: "bread that one baked together with roast meat" (פת שאפאה עם צלי). Rav Kahana son of Rav Chinnana the Elder teaches that bread baked in an oven together with roasting meat may not be eaten with kutach, a relish made with milk, because the bread has taken in the meat's aroma. The author uses the case for the attribute of what is found with the subject at the same time.

Pesachim 82b (ch. 4) — 1742 cites פסחים מ"ה and prints "R. Y. ben Beroka and R. Nachman said one thing" (ר"י בן ברוקא ור' נחמן אמרו דבר אחד); Sefaria, Pesachim 82b: "R. Yochanan ben Berokah and R. Nechemyah said one thing." Quoted: and "but acute mourning is like a disqualification after the sprinkling" (והא אנינות כלאחר זריקה הויא). The question is whether an offering disqualified after its blood was sprinkled must be left overnight until its appearance decays before it is burned, or may be burned at once; R. Yochanan says that R. Yochanan ben Berokah, who burns at once, and R. Nechemyah agree, since R. Nechemyah holds that Aaron's sin-offering was burned because of his acute mourning for his sons — a disqualification that comes after sprinkling — and it was burned immediately. R. Yochanan ben Berokah is a Tanna of the third generation; R. Nechemyah of the fourth. The author uses the pair as equivalent statements whose two matters are "not one, but similar."

Pesachim 113a (ch. 3) — Quoted: "Any sale on credit — it is doubtful whether the money comes, doubtful whether it does not" (כל אשראי – ספק אתי ספק לא אתי). Among Rav Pappa's maxims of business: what is acquired by document must still be collected, credit is uncertain, and what does come in is bad coin. The author uses the sentence as his example of a qualified statement asserted by way of doubt.

Yoma 76b (ch. 11) — Quoted: "Wine and fragrant scents make one clear-minded" (חמרא וריחני פקחין). In a play on the two readings of the word for new wine, Rav Kahana says that one who merits is made a head by it and one who does not is made poor, and the Gemara adds Rava's saying that wine and scents sharpen the mind. Rava is a Babylonian Amora of the fourth generation, head of the academy of Mechoza. The author uses the saying as an example of an effective cause.

Sukkah 40a (ch. 8) — Quoted: "Wood is excluded, since its benefit comes after its burning" (יצאו עצים, שהנאתן אחר ביעורן). The sanctity of Sabbatical-year produce attaches to what is "for you for food" (Leviticus 25:6) — to things whose benefit and whose consumption coincide; firewood is excluded, since its benefit, the heat of the coals, comes only after it has been consumed. The author uses the sentence as his example of a proof from sense: we see and feel that wood gives its benefit only after it burns.

Sukkah 53a (ch. 3) — Quoted: "If you come to My house, I will come to your house" (אם אתה תבוא אל ביתי – אני אבוא אל ביתך). At the Celebration of the Water-Drawing on Sukkot, Hillel the Elder used to say, "If I am here, all are here," and, in God's name, "If you come to My house I will come to your house; if you do not come to My house I will not come to your house," from "in every place where I cause My name to be mentioned I will come to you and bless you" (Exodus 20:21). Hillel heads the last of the "pairs," at the end of the first century BCE. The author uses the saying as an example of a hypothetical statement.

Beitzah 24a (ch. 5) — Quoted: "It is into a house that he is liable, but into enclosures, no" (לבית הוא דמחייב אבל לביברין לא). The inference the Gemara draws from R. Yehudah's mishnah on trapping (Shabbat 106a), to show that in his view an animal already inside an enclosure is not yet caught; see the entry on Shabbat 106a above.

Rosh Hashanah 29b (ch. 4) — Quoted: "The sounding of the shofar and the removal of bread from the oven are a skill and not a labor" (תקיעת שופר ורדיית הפת חכמה היא ואינה מלאכה). Rava argues that blowing the shofar on a Shabbat Rosh Hashanah is permitted by Torah law and forbidden only by a rabbinic decree, since a Sage of Shmuel's school taught that "no laborious work" excludes shofar-blowing and taking bread from the oven, which are skills, not labors. The author uses the sentence to show that "blowing" (תקיעה) here and "driving in" (תקע) in Eruvin 102b are one word with two senses.

Megillah 21a (ch. 11) — Quoted: "One who reads the Megillah standing or sitting" (הקורא את המגלה עומד ויושב). The mishnah opening the second chapter rules that the Megillah may be read standing or sitting, by one reader or two, and with or without a blessing according to local custom. The author uses it for the aspect of posture.

Moed Katan 16b (ch. 5; with II Samuel 23:1) — Quoted: "by implication there are first ones" (מכלל דאיכא ראשונים). Zutra bar Toviyah, reading Scripture before Rav Yehudah, reached "these are the last words of David" and asked: "last" implies "first" — what were the first? Rav Yehudah, who did not know, kept silent; asked again, he took offense, and Zutra imposed a day's admonition on himself. Zutra bar Toviyah is a Babylonian Amora of the second generation, a student of Rav; Rav Yehudah (bar Yechezkel) heads the academy of Pumbedita in the same generation. The author uses the inference as his example of understanding what was not said from what was said.

Chagigah 4a (ch. 8) — Quoted: "'All your males' — to include minors" (כל זכורך – לרבות את הקטנים), and the objection, "But we have learned: except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile and a minor!" (והא אנן תנן חוץ מחרש שוטה וקטן). A baraita reads "all your males" (Exodus 23:17), of the pilgrimage appearance at the Temple, as including minors; the Gemara sets against it the mishnah that exempts a deaf-mute, an imbecile and a minor; Abaye distinguishes a minor who has reached the age of training, and the verse is reduced to a mere support for a rabbinic duty. The author uses the objection as his example of disproof from convention — from a mishnah that cannot be disputed.

Chagigah 15b (ch. 5, twice) — Quoted: "All wool that was clean while on its mother comes up" (כל מאן דהוה נקי אגב אמה – סליק). Nimos the weaver asked R. Meir whether all wool that goes down into the dye-vat comes up dyed; R. Meir answered that wool that was clean while still on the sheep comes up dyed and wool that was not does not. The exchange stands at the end of the sugya on Acher, R. Meir's teacher who went astray, and the commentators read it as a parable: a disciple's outcome depends on what he was before he entered the study house. R. Meir is a Tanna of the fourth generation; Nimos the weaver is a gentile philosopher of his time. The author uses the statement as a categorical affirmative and derives from it its two necessary inferences, the contrapositive and the limited converse.

Seder Nashim

Yevamot 38a (ch. 3) — Quoted: "If he has taken her in, she is like his wife in every respect — provided that her marriage contract be on the property of her first husband" (כנסה, הרי היא כאשתו לכל דבר – ובלבד שתהא כתבתה על נכסי בעלה הראשון). The mishnah of Yevamot 4:3 concerns a widow awaiting her husband's brother (the yavam) and property that falls to her meanwhile; its last clause rules that once the brother marries her (yibbum, the levirate marriage) she is his wife in all respects, except that her ketubah — the settlement payable to a wife on divorce or widowhood — remains a charge on the first husband's estate. The author uses the clause as his first example of a conditional statement, a rule carrying a proviso.

Yevamot 40a (ch. 8) — Quoted: "And if there is a father there, the property belongs to the father" (ואם יש שם אב – נכסים של אב), and the Gemara's "for the Master said: a father precedes all who issue from his loins" (דאמר מר: אב קודם לכל יוצאי ירכו). The mishnah rules that a brother who released his brother's widow by chalitzah shares the dead brother's estate like any brother, but that if their father is alive the estate is the father's; the Gemara supports this from the received rule of inheritance (Bava Batra 115a) that a father precedes all his descendants. The author uses the exchange as his example of proof from convention: a mishnah verified by a received rule.

Yevamot 50a (ch. 4) — Quoted: "Rabban Gamliel says: there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce, nor levirate betrothal after levirate betrothal; and the Sages say: there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce, and there is levirate betrothal after levirate betrothal" (אין גט אחר גט ולא מאמר אחר מאמר; יש גט אחר גט ויש מאמר אחר מאמר). The mishnah that opens the fifth chapter asks whether, once a yavam has given a bill of divorce to one widow or made a levirate betrothal (מאמר, the rabbinic betrothal of the widow by money or document), a second such act — with her co-widow, or by another brother — has any legal effect; Rabban Gamliel says none, the Sages say it does, though nothing has effect after intercourse or chalitzah. The author uses the pair as his model of opposites: one predicate of one subject, affirmed by one side and denied by the other.

Yevamot 58b–59a (ch. 9, twice) — Quoted: "R. Chiyya bar Yosef inquired of Shmuel: a High Priest who betrothed a minor and she reached maturity under him — what is the law? Do we follow the time of marriage, or the time of betrothal?" (בעא מנה רבי חיא בר יוסף משמואל … בתר נשואין אזלינן או בתר ארוסין אזלינן), and Shmuel's answer that we follow the marriage. A High Priest must marry "a wife in her virginity" (Leviticus 21:13), which the Sages take to exclude a fully grown woman; the question is whether a girl betrothed while still fit, who grew up before the wedding, may be married. Shmuel answers from the mishnah at hand: women widowed or divorced from a forbidden marriage are disqualified from terumah, from a betrothal they are not, so it is the marriage that decides. R. Chiyya bar Yosef is an Amora of the second generation who studied under Rav and Shmuel in Babylonia before moving to the Land of Israel; Shmuel heads Nehardea in the first generation. The author uses the exchange as his model of a question of principle (אבעיא) and of its determination (פשיטות).

Yevamot 66a (ch. 4; ch. 8) — Quoted: "Whoever does not eat does not enable others to eat" (כל שאינו אוכל אינו מאכיל) and its companions, and "From where is it derived that when a priest has married a woman and acquired slaves, they eat of terumah? As it is said, 'And if a priest acquires a person, the purchase of his money, he may eat of it'" (Leviticus 22:11). The mishnah of Yevamot 7:1 rules that an Israelite woman who married a priest brings her slaves into his right to eat terumah, the priest's portion, while a priest's daughter married to an Israelite loses it for hers. The Gemara asks why the slaves of a woman forbidden to the priest do not eat, given the baraita that derives from "the purchase of his money" that both his wife and his slaves eat, and that "his acquisition who acquired an acquisition eats"; it answers with the rule "whoever eats enables others to eat, whoever does not eat does not enable," and defends the rule against the uncircumcised and impure priests (whose disability is only "a hurt in the mouth") and the mamzer. The author builds his ch. 4 examples of the converse and the obverse on the rule, and uses the baraita in ch. 8 as his example of a classical syllogism: the purchase of a priest's money eats terumah; his wife is the purchase of his money (a wife is acquired by money); therefore she eats.

Yevamot 84a (ch. 3) — Quoted: "There are women who are permitted to their husbands" (יש מתרות לבעליהן). The mishnah that opens the ninth chapter sorts the cases of a dead man's widow: some women are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to the brothers who would marry them, some the reverse, some permitted to both, some forbidden to both. The author uses the opening clause as his example of a partial statement, asserted of some members of a class.

Yevamot 102a (ch. 9, twice) — Quoted: "I said to him: are you at all acquainted with R. Yehudah ben Beteira?" (כלום אתה בקי ברבי יהודה בן בתירא), and the answer, "Yes." In a baraita R. Yose tells how he once went to Netzivin (Nisibis, in northern Mesopotamia), found an elder there, and asked whether he knew R. Yehudah ben Beteira, the sage of that town; the elder answered that he did and that the sage was a regular at his table, and R. Yose went on to ask whether he had seen him release a widow by chalitzah, and with a soft shoe or a hard sandal — the point at issue being whether chalitzah may be performed ab initio with a shoe. R. Yose (ben Chalafta) is a Tanna of the fourth generation; R. Yehudah ben Beteira is the sage of Nisibis, the Tanna of that Babylonian town. The author uses the question and its "yes" as his model of a query (שאלה) and of a plain answer.

Yevamot 102b (ch. 9) — Quoted: "It was taught in accordance with Rava: if she performed chalitzah with a shoe that had come unstitched, which covers most of the foot — her chalitzah is valid" (תניא כותה דרבא: חלצה במנעל הנפרם שחופה את רב הרגל – חליצתה כשרה). The baraita continues with a sandal whose sole has partly opened, sandals of cork or fiber, an amputee's wooden foot, a felt shoe and a leather sock, all valid for the rite in which the widow removes the brother's shoe. Rava is a Babylonian Amora of the fourth generation (Mechoza). The author uses the formula "it was taught in accordance with" as his example of a validation (סייעתא) that strengthens a statement without demonstrating it.

Yevamot 104b (ch. 9) — Quoted: "A deaf-mute man who underwent chalitzah and a deaf-mute woman who performed chalitzah — her chalitzah is invalid. What is the reason? Is it not because they are not capable of recitation?" and the answer, "No! Because they are not possessed of understanding" (לא! משום דלאו בני דעה נינהו). Rava rules that since the recitation of the chalitzah formula is not indispensable, mutes may perform the rite; the Gemara objects from the mishnah that a deaf-mute's chalitzah is invalid, apparently because he cannot recite, and Rava deflects it: the deaf-mute is excluded for want of understanding, while a mute "has understanding — it is his mouth that hurts him." The author uses the deflection as his example of an alternative answer (שינוי).

Yevamot 112b (ch. 3; ch. 6; ch. 9, twice) — Quoted: "Either he performs chalitzah or he performs levirate marriage" (או חולץ או מיבם), and Rami bar Chama's question, "What is different about a deaf-mute man and a deaf-mute woman, that the Rabbis instituted marriage for them, and what is different about an imbecile, that they did not?" with its answer: "for a deaf-mute the Rabbis' enactment can stand … for an imbecile it cannot" (דקימא תקנתא דרבנן). The mishnayot of Yevamot 14 work through brothers and wives who are deaf-mutes (חרש) or of sound mind (פקח): where the dead brother's widow is of sound mind and so is the surviving brother, "either he performs chalitzah or he performs levirate marriage," while a deaf-mute brother cannot release her, since chalitzah requires speech, and can only marry her. The Gemara asks why the Sages gave deaf-mutes a rabbinic marriage but not imbeciles and answers that no one can live with an imbecile — "a person does not dwell with a snake in one basket." Rami bar Chama is a Babylonian Amora of the fourth generation. The author uses "either … or" as his example of a disjunction (ch. 3) and of its truth condition, that every alternative be a live option (ch. 6); and the question and its answer as a query about a reason and its answer (ch. 9).

Yevamot 117b (ch. 9) — Quoted: "Two say 'he died' and one witness says 'he did not die' — what is it teaching us? If it speaks of those disqualified for testimony, and in accordance with R. Nechemyah, who follows the majority of opinions — it is the very same" (הינו הך). For a woman whose husband has disappeared even one witness, and even a witness normally disqualified, may testify that he died; R. Nechemyah taught that wherever the Torah accepted a single witness one follows the majority of voices. The Gemara asks what the mishnah adds by teaching that two such witnesses outweigh one, since the previous clause already taught the majority rule, and answers that it teaches the rule even where it leads to leniency. The author uses the question as his example of an objection (פרכא) to a redundant clause.

Yevamot 118a (ch. 9) — Quoted: "And let R. Meir disagree in the first clause as well!" (ולפלג רבי מאיר ברישא). The mishnah has one co-wife saying "he died" and the other "he was killed," and R. Meir forbids both to remarry because the testimonies conflict; the Gemara asks why R. Meir did not also dispute the first clause, where one says "he died" and the other "he did not die." R. Elazar answers that the first clause is indeed a dispute, taught by R. Yehudah and R. Shimon; R. Yochanan that even R. Meir concedes that "he did not die" is no contradiction in testimony about a husband. The author uses the question as his example of an objection to the arrangement of a statement.

Yevamot 120b (ch. 9) — Quoted: "And set them against one another: a person does not impart impurity until his soul departs — even one who is cut open, and even one who is dying" (ורמינהי: אדם אינו מטמא עד שתצא נפשו, אפלו מגויד, ואפלו גוסס). The mishnah forbids testifying to a man's death unless one saw his face, "even if they saw him cut open"; the Gemara asks whether a man cut open can live, and sets against the mishnah the ruling of Oholot 1:6 that a dying man, even one cut open, does not convey the impurity of a corpse until he dies — from which it follows that he cannot survive. Abaye resolves it as a dispute of Tannaim. The author uses the "and set them against one another" as his model of an apparent contradiction (רמיא) between two statements.

Ketubot 36b (ch. 4) — Quoted: "R. Yehudah and R. Dosa said one thing. R. Yehudah — that which we have said; R. Dosa — as it was taught: a captive woman eats terumah" (רבי יהודה ורבי דוסא אמרו דבר אחד … שבויה אוכלת בתרומה). A woman who has been held captive is presumed to have been violated, which would disqualify a priest's wife or daughter from eating terumah and deny a girl the fine due to a virgin who was raped. The mishnah has R. Yehudah rule that a redeemed captive "remains in her sanctity" and receives the fine; R. Yochanan matches him with R. Dosa's ruling that a captive priestess eats terumah — "what did that Arab do to her? because he fondled her, did he disqualify her from the priesthood?" — and Rabbah then suggests that the two might yet differ, each ruling for a reason of his own. R. Dosa (ben Harkinas) is a Tanna of the first–second generation, an elder at Yavneh; R. Yehudah of the fourth. The author uses R. Yochanan's pairing as his example of equivalent statements whose words differ.

Ketubot 57a (ch. 4) — Quoted: "R. Tarfon says: they give her everything as terumah; R. Akiva says: half non-sacred food and half terumah" (רבי טרפון אומר: נותנין לה הכל תרומה; רבי עקיבא אומר: מחצה חלין ומחצה תרומה). A betrothed woman whose wedding was delayed by the husband is fed from his property; if he is a priest she may eat terumah, and the Tannaim dispute the proportion — R. Akiva requiring half of ordinary food, since she cannot eat terumah in her days of impurity. R. Tarfon and R. Akiva are Tannaim of the third generation. The author uses the pair as his example of variant statements, two differing predicates of one subject.

Ketubot 60a (ch. 11) — Quoted: "This and that are one measure" (אידי ואידי חד שעורא הוא). Two baraitot give R. Yehoshua's limit for how long a child may go on nursing: "even four or five years" and "even if his bundle is on his shoulders"; the Gemara reconciles them as two descriptions of one age. R. Yehoshua (ben Chananiah) is a Tanna of the second generation. The author uses the phrase for the aspect of similarity.

Ketubot 75a (ch. 3, twice; ch. 11) — Quoted: "It is possible to remove it with wine vinegar" (אפשר לעברה בקיוהא דחמרא), and "with regard to a woman it is not possible" (גבי אשה לא אפשר). The blemishes that annul a woman's betrothal are those that disqualify priests from serving, and a baraita adds sweat, a mole and bad breath for women; Rav Ashi explains why these count against a woman and not against a priest: a priest can wash off his sweat with wine vinegar and hold a pepper in his mouth while he serves, but a woman cannot live that way permanently. Rav Ashi heads the academy of Sura in the sixth generation. The author uses the two clauses as his examples of qualified statements by way of possibility and impossibility (ch. 3), and the vinegar for the aspect of means (ch. 11).

Gittin 80b (ch. 8) — Quoted: "Let him combine them and teach them together!" (ליערבינהו וליתנינהו). The mishnah invalidates a bill of divorce dated by a foreign kingdom and, in a later clause, one in which the husband changed his or his wife's name or their towns; the Gemara asks who teaches the second clause — if R. Meir, who taught the first, he should have combined the two into one ruling; hence it is the Sages. The author uses the demand as his example of an objection to the way statements are arranged.

Seder Nezikin

Bava Kamma 27a (ch. 8) — Quoted: "He began with a jug and ended with a barrel!" (פתח בכד וסים בחבית). The mishnah that opens the third chapter rules that one who left a jug (כד) in the public domain and had it broken by a passer-by cannot claim, and that if the passer-by was hurt, "the owner of the barrel (חבית) is liable"; the Gemara notes the shift of word here and in two other mishnayot, and Rav Pappa concludes that the two words name the same vessel, the point mattering for sales. The author uses the observation as his example of an objection to inconsistent wording.

Bava Kamma 29a (ch. 8) — Quoted: "Rav Acha said: such as where it crossed through water by way of the overflow of the river," and the Gemara's "What are the circumstances? If there is another road — he is negligent! And if there is no other road — he is under compulsion!" (אי דאיכא דרכא אחרינא – פושע הוא! ואי דליכא דרכא אחרינא – אנוס הוא). The sugya seeks a case in which the Tannaim could dispute whether one who stumbled and dropped his load is negligent; Rav Acha proposes a camel led through a river's flood, and the Gemara rejects the proposal because either way the case is decided without dispute, and finds another (the owner stumbled and the camel over him). Rav Acha is a Babylonian Amora. The author uses the rejection as his example of the dilemma (ממה נפשך), in which every way of reading a statement is shown false.

Bava Kamma 83b (ch. 8, three times; ch. 9; ch. 10) — Quoted: the mishnah "If one blinded his eye, cut off his hand, broke his leg — they view him as though he were a slave being sold in the market" (רואין אותו כאלו הוא עבד נמכר בשוק); the objection from "But it is written, 'a man who strikes any human soul shall surely die'" (Leviticus 24:17); "Say: actual death!" (אימא במיתה ממש); "It should not enter your mind, for it is juxtaposed to 'one who strikes a beast shall pay for it'" (דהא אתקש למכה בהמה ישלמנה); "A further difficulty troubled the Tanna: what did you see to derive from 'one who strikes a beast'? derive from 'one who strikes a man'!" (תו קא קשיא לתנא); "We derive damages from damages, and not damages from death" (דנין נזקין מנזקין ואין דנין נזקין ממיתה); and "On the contrary! We derive man from man, and not man from beast" (אדרבא). The mishnah that opens the eighth chapter lists the five heads of compensation for injury and measures the first, "damage," by the fall in the victim's price as a slave. The Gemara asks why the Torah's "an eye for an eye" is taken as money and works through the Tannaitic derivations: the verse about a man who "strikes any human soul" is read as money because it stands beside the verse about striking a beast, which is paid in money, and because the verse ends "as he gives a blemish in a man, so shall it be given in him," where "giving" is money; the baraita's phrase "if it is your wish to say" is explained as the Tanna's own further doubt — why derive from the beast and not from the man — answered by the rule that damages are learned from damages, which the Gemara turns around with "on the contrary." The author draws from this one page his examples of disproof from a verse, of indirect disproof through an analogism, of "just the opposite," and, in chs. 9 and 10, of the ascribed difficulty (קשיא מגדת) and the difficulty raised against the report of it.

Bava Kamma 84a (ch. 8) — Quoted: "The school of R. Yishmael taught: the verse says 'so shall it be given in him' — and 'giving' is nothing but money. But if so, 'as he gives a blemish in a man' — is this too money?" (אלא מעתה: כאשר יתן מום באדם – הכי נמי דממון הוא). Another derivation of monetary compensation, from the word "given" in Leviticus 24:20; the Gemara objects that the same verse uses "give" of inflicting the wound, and answers that the school of R. Yishmael expounds the redundancy of "so shall it be given" beside the earlier "as he did, so shall be done to him," the second "give" being written only to match the first. The author uses the objection as his example of a reductio: if every "giving" were money, "as he gives a blemish" would be money too, which is plainly false.

Bava Kamma 87a, with 88a (ch. 8, twice) — Quoted: the mishnah "One who wounds his own Canaanite slave is exempt" (החובל בעבד כנעני שלו פטור); the proof from "when men strive together, a man and his brother" (Deuteronomy 25:11), "a slave is excluded, who has no brotherhood"; the Sages' answer, "he is his brother in the commandments" (אחיו הוא במצוות); the difficulty "but if so, according to the Rabbis a slave should be fit for kingship" (עבד יהא כשר למלכות); and the reply "and according to your reasoning (ולטעמיך), a convert should pose a difficulty for you according to all! Rather, the verse says 'from among your brothers' — the choicest of your brothers." The mishnah at 87a exempts a master who injures his own slave and, in the next clause, has R. Yehudah deny the payment for humiliation to any Canaanite slave; the Gemara at 88a gives R. Yehudah's reason from "a man and his brother" in the law of humiliation and the Sages' rejoinder that the slave, bound by the commandments, is a brother; it then presses the Sages — if the slave is a brother, he should qualify for the throne, of which the Torah says "from among your brothers" (Deuteronomy 17:15) — and they answer that a convert, a brother on every view, is equally barred, so the verse must mean the choicest of the brothers. The author uses the Sages' rejoinder as his example of rebutting a proof (the verse does not exclude the slave) and the reply to the kingship question as his example of "and according to your reasoning."

Bava Kamma 104a (ch. 7) — Quoted: "What are the circumstances? If he did not appoint him before witnesses, how do we know? Rather, is it not that he appointed him before witnesses?" (היכי דמי? אי דלא עשאו בעדים – מנא ידעינן? אלא לאו – דעשאו בעדים). The mishnah forbids a robber making restitution to hand the money to the victim's son or agent; Rav Chisda holds that an agent appointed before witnesses is a true agent, and the Gemara asks how the mishnah's agent can be other than one appointed before witnesses — if there were none, how would his agency be known? Rav Chisda answers that the mishnah speaks of the victim's hired hand or harvester. The author uses the Gemara's question as his example of the disjunctive syllogism: either he appointed him before witnesses or he did not, and the second is excluded.

Bava Kamma 117a (ch. 6) — Quoted: "A lion has come up from Babylonia" (ארי עלה מבבל). Rav Kahana, having killed an informer, was sent by Rav to the Land of Israel to study under R. Yochanan on condition that he ask no difficulties for seven years; he met Reish Lakish reviewing the day's lecture, poured out objections and resolutions, and Reish Lakish warned R. Yochanan, "A lion has come up from Babylonia; let the master look into tomorrow's lecture." Rav Kahana sat silent and was moved back row by row until R. Yochanan said, "The lion you spoke of has become a fox." Rav Kahana is a student of Rav in the second generation of Amoraim; R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish head the academy of Tiberias. The author uses the "lion" as his example of a statement whose truth lies in its figurative sense.

Bava Metzia 8b (ch. 11, twice) — Quoted: "for it walks because of him" (דאזלא מחמתה). Rav Yehudah's uncertainty about Shmuel's ruling on a found animal claimed by one who rides it and one who leads it: does the rider prevail, since he holds it, or the leader, since the animal walks because of him? The author uses the phrase for the effective cause and, in the same aspect-list, for the result — the walking is the effect of the one who leads.

Sanhedrin 53a (ch. 7; with Shabbat 73a) — Quoted: the premise that the Shabbat-breaker is stoned. The mishnah that opens the seventh chapter's list, "These are the ones who are stoned," runs from incest and idolatry through "one who desecrates Shabbat" to the rebellious son. The author joins it to Shabbat 73a to form the premise "one who performs a primary labor on Shabbat is liable to stoning."

Sanhedrin 90a (ch. 3; ch. 8; with Isaiah 60:21) — Quoted: "All Israel have a share in the World to Come, as it is said, 'And your people are all righteous; they shall inherit the land forever'" (כל ישראל יש להם חלק לעולם הבא). The mishnah that opens the chapter Chelek states the rule, proves it from Isaiah 60:21, and lists the exceptions: one who denies the resurrection from the Torah, one who denies that the Torah is from Heaven, and the epikoros. The author uses the statement as his model of a categorical statement (ch. 3) and its proof-text as his example of a statement verified by a verse (ch. 8).

Sanhedrin 91a (ch. 6) — Quoted: "If you do so, you will be called an expert physician" (אם אתה עושה כן – רופא אמן תקרא). A heretic mocked Geviha ben Pesisa: "Woe to you wicked who say the dead will live — the living die, and the dead will live?" Geviha answered, "Woe to you who say the dead will not live: if those who never were live, shall not those who once lived live all the more?" The heretic, called wicked, said, "If I stand up I will kick you and flatten your hump" — Geviha was a hunchback — and Geviha replied, "If you do so, you will be called an expert physician and take high fees." Geviha ben Pesisa is remembered as Israel's spokesman before Alexander of Macedon in the Second Temple period. The author uses the reply as a hypothetical statement whose two parts are both false while their dependence is true.

Horayot 9a (ch. 8) — Quoted: "And what is different about 'from one' that they derive from it? That the Merciful One wrote it at the end, with regard to the tenth of an ephah, to say that whoever is liable for the tenth of an ephah is liable for all of them; for if it should enter your mind that one may be liable for one even though he is not liable for all, let the Merciful One have written this 'from one' with regard to poverty, or with regard to wealth" (ומאי שנא מאחת דמשמע להו). The sliding-scale offering has three grades — a lamb for the wealthy, two birds in poverty, a tenth of an ephah of flour in extreme poverty — and a baraita has R. Akiva exempt the anointed High Priest, who by his office can never be poor, from all three; against the suggestion that he is exempt only from the flour grade, the Gemara answers that "one who obtains atonement by one obtains it by all," and Abaye and Rava explain that R. Akiva reads this out of the phrase "from one of these," which the Torah placed at the end, by the flour offering (Leviticus 5:13), so as to tie liability for all three grades to liability for the last. The author uses the argument as his example of a demonstration by hypothetical syllogism.

Horayot 10a (ch. 7) — Quoted: "If the anointed priest, who brings his sin-offering even once he has left office, does not bring for prior sins, is it not right that the prince, who does not bring his sin-offering once he has left office, should not bring for prior sins?" and its rebuttal, "What is special about the anointed priest? That he does not bring for an unwitting act; will you say the same of the prince, who does bring for an unwitting act?" (מה למשיח שכן אינו מביא בשגגת מעשה). The baraitot on 10a establish from Leviticus 4:3 and 4:22 that the anointed High Priest brings his bull even after leaving office and that neither he nor the prince (נשיא, the king) brings for sins committed before appointment, in each case blocking an a fortiori argument between the two: the High Priest brings only when he acted on his own mistaken ruling, the king for any unwitting act. The wording the author quotes, arguing from the High Priest to the king, is that of the Sifra's parallel (Dibbura de-Chovah, parashah 5 §2); Horayot 10a runs the same argument in the other direction and rebuts it with the same distinction. The author uses the rebuttal to show an a fortiori argument failing because the "greater" case is lesser in another respect.

Seder Kodashim

Zevachim 99a (ch. 8) — Quoted: "The priest who effects atonement takes a share, and one who does not effect atonement does not take a share" (כהן המחטא – מחלק, ושאינו מחטא – אינו מחלק); "And is this a rule? But there is the entire watch, who do not effect atonement and yet take a share!" (והרי משמרה כלה); "We mean one who is fit to effect atonement" (ראוי לחטוי קאמרינן). Reish Lakish derives from "the priest who effects atonement shall eat it" (Leviticus 6:19) that only the officiating priest eats of a sin-offering; the Gemara objects that the whole priestly watch — the family group serving its week in the Temple — shares the meat though only one priest throws the blood, and answers that the verse means any priest fit to officiate, then refines "eat" to "share" to exclude minors. Reish Lakish is an Amora of the Land of Israel of the second generation (Tiberias). The author uses the exchange as his example of a predicate asserted potentially rather than actually.

Zevachim 116a (ch. 11) — Quoted: "What tiding did he hear, that he came and converted? He heard of the splitting of the Red Sea and came" (מה שמועה שמע ובא ונתגייר? קריעת ים סוף שמע ובא). On "and Jethro heard" (Exodus 18:1) the Tannaim differ: R. Yehoshua says he heard of the war with Amalek, R. Elazar HaModa'i of the giving of the Torah, and R. Eliezer of the splitting of the sea, the report that made the kings of Canaan melt and that Rahab too recalled. The author takes R. Eliezer's answer as his example of a motive (מעורר), what rouses a voluntary agent to act.

Menachot 94b (ch. 11) — Quoted: "like a box broken open" (כמין תבה פרוצה). The Sages describe the shape of the showbread loaves: R. Chanina, like a box open at two ends — a flat base with two upright sides — and R. Yochanan, like a rocking ship, with a narrow keel; the Gemara tests each shape against the bowls of frankincense, the rods and the panels of the Table. R. Chanina (bar Chama) and R. Yochanan are Amoraim of the Land of Israel of the first and second generations. The author uses the phrase for the physical form.

Chullin 2a (ch. 2; ch. 3; ch. 6) — Quoted: "All may slaughter, and their slaughter is valid — except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile and a minor" (הכל שוחטין ושחיטתן כשרה – חוץ מחרש שוטה וקטן), and the Gemara's "'All may slaughter' — from the outset" (הכל שוחטין – לכתחלה). The first mishnah of Chullin permits everyone to slaughter except the three who lack competence, lest they spoil the slaughter, and validates even their slaughter when others watch; the Gemara at once notes that "all may slaughter" speaks of permission from the outset while "their slaughter is valid" speaks only of validity after the fact, and works to reconcile the two. The author uses the Gemara's reading of "all may slaughter" in ch. 2 as the natural sense of a form of words, the mishnah's "except" in ch. 3 as his example of an exceptive statement, and in ch. 6 its two intentions.

Chullin 17b (ch. 11) — Quoted: "it resembles an awn of grain" (דמיא לסאסאה). Among the questions put to Rav Ashi about the slaughtering knife, Rav Acha son of Rav Avya asks about a blade whose edge is rough like the awn of a grain-ear though it has no true notch; Rav Ashi answers, "Who will give us of its meat that we may eat?" — that is, it is unfit. Both are Babylonian Amoraim of the sixth generation. The author uses the phrase for the aspect of similarity.

Chullin 19b (ch. 8) — Quoted: "There are those who say: he even turns them back; and there are those who say: he turns them back specifically; and it stands to reason like the one who says 'he even turns them back'" (ומסתברא כמאן דאמר אף מחזיר). The sons of R. Chiyya describe the pinching (מליקה) of a bird offering, in which the priest cuts through the nape with his thumbnail: he turns the windpipe and gullet back behind the nape and pinches. The two traditions differ on whether turning them back is merely permitted or required, and the Gemara inclines to the first from the mishnah's ruling that pinching from the nape is valid. The sons of R. Chiyya, Yehudah and Chizkiyah, stand at the passage from Tannaim to Amoraim in the Land of Israel. The author uses "it stands to reason" as his example of sevara, a proof that inclines the mind without settling the matter.

Chullin 43a (ch. 11, twice) — Quoted: "The gullet has two linings" (שני עורות יש לו לושט) and "the outer red, and the inner white" (חיצון אדום ופנימי לבן). Rava rules that the gullet (ושט) has two membranes and that a perforation of one without the other leaves the animal kosher; the Gemara asks why he names the colors and answers that if the colors are reversed the animal is a tereifah. The author uses the first clause for the aspect of parts and the second for quality.

Chullin 50a (ch. 11) — Quoted: "intestines that were perforated and mucus seals them" (בני מעין שנקבו ולחה סותמתן). A baraita in the name of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel rules such an animal kosher; Rav Kahana explains the mucus as the slime of the intestines that comes out under pressure. The author uses the case for the aspect of affection.

Chullin 58b (ch. 11; 1742 prints no reference) — Quoted: "for it pecks their intestines" (דמנקרא להו למעיא; Sefaria: דמינקבה להו למעיינה). Shmuel rules that an animal force-fed asafoetida (חלתית, an acrid resin used as a spice and drug) is a tereifah, "because it perforates its intestines" (דמינקבה להו למעיינה); Rashi: a sliver of asafoetida is sharp and pierces the bowel. Rav Sheizvi objects from a baraita that lists asafoetida among things an animal may eat and remain kosher, and the Gemara distinguishes the leaves, which the baraita means, from the slivers, which Shmuel means. Shmuel heads Nehardea in the first generation of Babylonian Amoraim. The author quotes the clause, with a slightly different last word, as his example of a natural action, one thing acting on another by nature; the 1742 ר against Sefaria's ב is left as printed; the [ed.] note in ch. 11 gives the Sefaria wording.

Chullin 76a (ch. 11) — Quoted: "hard ones are the convergence of the sinews; soft ones are not the convergence of the sinews" (אשוני הוו צמת הגידין, רכיכי לא הוו צמת הגידין). The mishnah makes an animal a tereifah if its hind leg is cut above the joint or if "the convergence of the sinews" (צומת הגידין) is removed, and the Gemara asks where that convergence lies; Abaye gives four handbreadths in an ox and, for small cattle, says that the sinews count as the convergence only while they stand out from the flesh — in the printed Talmud's words, "prominent ones (בליטי) are the convergence, sunken ones (בליעי) are not." The author's "hard" and "soft" is a variant reading of Abaye's words. He uses them for the aspect of quality.

Keritot 26a (ch. 7) — Quoted: "The community cannot be derived from the prince, since there is room to object: what is special about the prince? That among his offerings there is a female" (צבור מנשיא לא אתי, דאיכא למפרך: מה לנשיא שכן יש בקרבנו נקבה). The Gemara seeks a source that a sin-offering is due only once the sin becomes known, and tests whether the rule stated for one class of sinner can be carried to another; it refuses to derive the community's offering from the prince's because the prince, for unwitting idolatry, brings a she-goat while the community's offerings are all male. The author uses the refusal as his example of an analogism broken because the two subjects are not truly alike.

Seder Taharot

Mishnah Kelim 28:7 (ch. 11) — Quoted: "like a gamma" (כמין גם). A patch sewn to a garment on one side only is not joined to it for impurity, on two opposite sides it is; "if he made it like a gamma" — sewn on two adjacent sides, in the shape of the Greek letter Γ (Bartenura: east and south, or west and north) — R. Akiva declares the garment impure and the Sages pure. The author uses the phrase for the physical form.

Mishnah Nega'im 12:4 (ch. 3) — Quoted: "Jerusalem does not become impure through nega'im" (ירושלים אינה מטמאה בנגעים). The mishnah fixes the wood and earth a wall must contain to be subject to the leprous marks of houses (Leviticus 14), and excludes the walls of a manger and of a garden fence, and "Jerusalem and outside the Land." Bartenura: the verse speaks of "a house of the land of your possession," and Jerusalem was not divided among the tribes as a possession. The author uses the clause as his example of a particular statement, whose subject is a single individual.

Mishnah Parah 9:3 (ch. 8) — Quoted: "except for the weasel, because it laps" (חוץ מן החלדה, מפני שהיא מלקת). Water drawn for the ashes of the red cow is spoiled if a beast drinks from it; all birds spoil it except the dove, which sucks without letting water back, and no creeping thing spoils it except the weasel, which laps with its tongue and lets spittle fall back into the water (Bartenura); Rabban Gamliel adds the snake, because it vomits, R. Eliezer the mouse. The author uses the weasel's lapping as his example of a proprium — a property that always accompanies the subject without being its essence.

Talmud Yerushalmi

Yerushalmi Shabbat 13:3 (ch. 4) — Quoted: "R. Yonah said: no transgression is a mitzvah; R. Yose said: no mitzvah is a transgression" (רבי יונה אמר: אין עברה מצוה; רבי יוסה אמר: אין מצוה עברה). The halachah concerns one who tears his garment on Shabbat in mourning, fulfilling the duty of tearing though he has transgressed; the sugya moves to the stolen matzah, over which no blessing may be said — R. Hoshaya: "he who blesses over robbery blasphemes" (Psalms 10:3) — and R. Yonah and R. Yose state the principle in their two ways, R. Ila adding from "these are the commandments" (Leviticus 27:34) that a deed done as commanded is a mitzvah and otherwise is not. R. Yonah and R. Yose are Amoraim of the Land of Israel of the fourth generation, who headed the academy of Tiberias together. The author uses the two sayings as his example of converse statements, in which subject and predicate change places.

Halachic midrash

Torat Kohanim (Sifra), Dibbura de-Chovah, parashah 5 (ch. 7, three times; ch. 8) — Quoted: "An individual is excepted from the class of the community, and a prince is excepted from the class of the community; just as an individual brings a suspensive guilt-offering, so too a prince brings a suspensive guilt-offering" (§9); "If the individual, who does not bring a male for a known sin, brings a suspensive guilt-offering, is it not right that the prince, who does bring a male for a known sin, should bring a suspensive guilt-offering? — Let the anointed priest prove it, for he brings a male for a known sin and does not bring a suspensive guilt-offering" (§7, משיח יוכיח); and the a fortiori from the anointed priest to the prince about prior sins with its rebuttal (§2). The Sifra expounds Leviticus 4:22–26, the sin-offering of the prince (נשיא, the king), whose offering for a known sin is a male goat, where an ordinary Israelite brings a female and the anointed High Priest a bull, and only for a mistaken ruling he acted on. The suspensive guilt-offering (אשם תלוי) is brought for a doubtful sin; the midrash tries to settle whether the prince brings one by analogy from the individual, by an a fortiori argument, and by asking which of the two the prince more resembles, and finally derives it from the word "and he is guilty." The 1742 print cites only "Torat Kohanim," without naming the section; the passage is the Sifra's Dibbura de-Chovah. He uses §9 as his example of an analogism, §7 as his example of an a fortiori argument and of its rebuttal by a third case that "proves otherwise," and the same rebuttal again in ch. 8 as the annulling of a syllogism.

Sifrei Bamidbar 7 (Naso, on Numbers 5:13) (ch. 8) — Quoted: "when the light prohibition came upon the lightly prohibited, it forbade her to her forbidders" (כשבא אסור הקל על אסור הקלה – אסר את אוסריו). The Sifrei reads "and a man lie with her" of the suspected wife: "with her — and not with her sister," and explains why the exclusion is needed: one might have argued that if the lighter prohibition (adultery with a married woman, whose bond her husband can end by divorce) coming upon the lightly forbidden woman forbids her to the one who forbids her — her husband, who alone had her — then the graver prohibition (the wife's sister, forbidden for life) should all the more forbid her to him; Abba Chanan in R. Eliezer's name adds "with her — and not with his mother-in-law." The author uses the passage to show one subject called "light" in one aspect (she has a release) and "severe" in another (her punishment is strangulation, the sister's and mother-in-law's excision).

Aggadic midrash

Bereshit Rabbah 51:3 (ch. 5) — Quoted: "No evil thing descends from above" (אין דבר רע יורד מלמעלה). On the brimstone and fire rained on Sodom, R. Chanina (whom the commentators identify as R. Chanina ben Pazi, an Amora of the Land of Israel) says that nothing evil comes down from Heaven; challenged from "fire and hail, snow and vapor" (Psalms 148:8), he answers that it is "the storm wind that fulfils His word" — they turn harmful only below. The author uses the saying as a categorical negative statement and derives its one necessary inference, the complete converse.

Scripture

Genesis 28:15 and 32:8 (ch. 9) — "Behold, I am with you, and I will guard you wherever you go," God's promise to Jacob at Beth-El, against "And Jacob was very afraid," before his meeting with Esau. The two verses are the apparent contradiction R. Yaakov bar Idi raises at Berachot 4a, resolved by "perhaps sin will cause it."

Exodus 12:16 (ch. 3; ch. 6) — "No work at all shall be done on them; only what every person is to eat, that alone may be done for you" (הוא לבדו יעשה לכם). The verse permits on the festival only the work needed to prepare food. The author uses "that alone" as his example of an exclusive statement and, in ch. 6, shows that its truth hangs on nothing else being permitted.

Leviticus 11:2 (ch. 5) — "These are the creatures that you may eat" (זאת החיה אשר תאכלו), opening the list of permitted animals. The author uses it to show that a statement carries with it what it does not say: the other species are not permitted.

Leviticus 22:11 (ch. 8) — "And if a priest acquires a person, the purchase of his money, he may eat of it" (וכהן כי יקנה נפש קנין כספו הוא יאכל בו) — the priest's slave eats terumah. This is the verse from which Yevamot 66a derives that a priest's wife, "the purchase of his money," eats terumah; the author uses the derivation as a classical syllogism.

Leviticus 24:17–21 (ch. 8) — "And a man who strikes any human soul shall surely die"; "one who strikes a beast shall pay for it"; "as he gives a blemish in a man, so shall it be given in him"; "one who strikes a beast shall pay, and one who strikes a man shall die." These are the verses Bava Kamma 83b–84a reads as monetary compensation for injury, and the author's examples of disproof, indirect disproof and reductio are drawn from their exposition.

Deuteronomy 25:11 (ch. 8) — "When men strive together, a man and his brother" (כי ינצו אנשים יחדו איש ואחיו). Bava Kamma 88a reads "his brother" as excluding the Canaanite slave, and the Sages answer that he is a brother in the commandments; the author uses the exchange as a rebutted proof.

II Samuel 23:1 (ch. 5) — "And these are the last words of David" (ואלה דברי דוד האחרנים). From "last" the Talmud at Moed Katan 16b infers "first"; the author uses the inference as his example of understanding what is not said.

I Kings 18:21 (ch. 6) — Elijah on Mount Carmel: "If the Lord is God, follow Him; and if Baal, follow him" (ואם הבעל לכו אחריו). The author uses the second clause as a hypothetical statement that is true though both its parts are false.

Isaiah 30:14 (ch. 8) — The shattered potter's vessel: "there shall not be found among its fragments a shard to take fire from a hearth or to draw water from a pool" (לחתות אש מיקוד ולחשף מים מגבא). The verse is the ground of R. Meir's and R. Yose's exchange at Shabbat 82a, the author's example of "from there is the proof."

Isaiah 60:21 (ch. 3; ch. 8) — "And your people are all righteous; they shall inherit the land forever" (ועמך כלם צדיקים לעולם יירשו ארץ). The proof-text of the mishnah "All Israel have a share in the World to Come" (Sanhedrin 90a); the author uses it as a statement verified by a verse.