Chapter 3 · פרק ג

Now every statement that is made, every line of reasoning (sevara) that is reasoned out, and every matter that is conceived cannot but be built of two parts,

namely: of a matter that is affirmed or negated, and of a thing in which that matter is affirmed or of which it is negated;

for example, Rav Adda bar Ahavah said, "Women are obligated in the sanctification of the day [i.e., Kiddush]" — he affirmed one matter, which is the obligation of the sanctification of the day, in one thing, namely: the class of women.

Now the matter that is affirmed or negated is called the "predicate," and the thing in which it is affirmed or of which it is negated is called the "subject";

it follows that the subject of this statement is "women," and the predicate is the obligation in the sanctification of the day.

And from both of these standpoints statements are divided into different kinds.

From the standpoint of the subjects, statements are divided into three kinds:

categorical, particular, partial.

Categorical — these are the statements whose subject is general, namely, that it embraces many individuals and the predicate in that statement is asserted of all of them;

for example (Sanhedrin 30) [ed. Sanhedrin 90a], "All Israel have a share in the world to come."

Now this embraces many individuals, who are the members of the Israelite nation, and the predicate, which is the share in the world to come, is asserted of all of them.

Particular — these are those whose subject is one individual only;

for example: "Jerusalem does not become impure through leprous marks [on its houses]."

Partial — those in whose subject some members of one class are mentioned;

for example: "There are [women who are] permitted to their husbands," etc. — the intent in it is that of some members of the class of women the predicate is asserted, which is the permission to their husbands.

However, there is the unqualified statement (stam), in whose subject the word "all" is not mentioned, and nevertheless its force is like the force of the categorical statement;

for example: "Women are obligated in the sanctification of the day," which we mentioned above — now the intent in it is that all women are obligated in the sanctification of the day.

From the standpoint of the predicates, statements are divided into eleven kinds.

This is because not every predicate whatsoever is asserted of every subject whatsoever in one manner; rather, there is that which is asserted in one manner and that which is asserted in another manner, and from this standpoint statements differ according to their kinds.

The first kind — this is the whole class of statements in which a predicate is asserted of a subject without any condition or limitation, like the statements we mentioned above and others besides them;

and this is called a simple statement (stam).

The second kind — those in which the predicate is asserted of the subject in a qualified and limited manner,

such as when the predicate is asserted by way of certainty or necessity; for example (Pesachim 4) [ed. Pesachim 9b]: "Since a weasel or a marten [bardelas] are found there, they certainly dragged it off at that time";

or when they assert it by way of possibility, for example (Ketubot 75): "It is possible to remove it [the sweat] with the sourness of wine";

or when they assert it by way of doubt, for example: "All credit — it is doubtful whether [the money] will come, doubtful whether it will not come";

or when they assert it by way of impossibility (Ketubot, ibid.): "In the case of a woman it is not possible."

And likewise all the like.

The third kind — this is the statement in which a predicate is asserted of a subject and negated of everything else;

for example, the statement of the verse "that alone may be done for you" [Exodus 12:16] — it asserted the permission of doing [work] for the need of a person's food, and negated it of everything other than this;

and this is called an exclusive statement (me'ma'et).

The fourth kind — that which excludes the predicate from some of what is included in the subject of that statement;

for example (Chullin 2): "All may slaughter, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor" —

for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor are also included in the meaning of the word "all," and the predicate, namely the permission to slaughter, is excluded from them by means of the word "except";

and this is called an exceptive statement (motzi).

The fifth kind — in which a predicate is asserted of a subject, but not absolutely, rather in one respect or with one condition;

for example (Yevamot 38): "[Once] he has taken her in [marriage], she is like his wife in every respect, provided that her marriage settlement [ketubah] be upon the property [of her first husband]," etc.;

and likewise (Demai 12) [ed. Mishnah Demai 1:2]: "They may redeem it [second-tithe money of demai], silver for silver," etc., "provided that he again redeems the produce";

and this is called a conditional statement (mugbal).

The sixth kind — that which makes the existence of one matter depend on the existence of another matter;

for example (ibid. 15) [ed. Mishnah Demai 4:4]: "If a poor man or a priest were accustomed to eat with him, they may come and eat"; "If you come to my house, I will come to your house";

and this is called a hypothetical statement (talui).

Two parts are distinguished in it: the antecedent and the consequent.

The antecedent is the part in which the condition is mentioned, for example, "if a poor man or a priest were accustomed to eat with him";

the consequent is that which depends on the first, for example: "they may come and eat."

The seventh kind — a statement in which two or more predicates are asserted of one subject, or one predicate of two or more subjects; and it divides into two parts.

The first part is that the predicates are asserted of the subject together, and likewise the predicate of the subjects;

for example (Kilayim 31) [ed. Mishnah Kilayim 8:1]: "Mixed seeds of the vineyard are forbidden to be sown and to be kept, and are forbidden for benefit";

and likewise (Terumot 48) [ed. Mishnah Terumot 1:7]: "One does not separate terumah by measure, nor by weight, nor by number."

Now here different predicates were asserted — which are the prohibition of keeping, the prohibition of sowing, and the prohibition of benefit — of mixed seeds of the vineyard; and likewise the prohibition of measuring, the prohibition of weighing, and the prohibition of counting, of the separation of terumah.

And when they said (Demai 17) [ed. Mishnah Demai 6:1]: "One who receives a field [as a sharecropper] from an Israelite, from a Samaritan, or from a gentile, divides [the produce] in their presence,"

one predicate — which is the division in their presence — was asserted of three subjects, which are: one who receives a field from a Samaritan, one who receives it from an Israelite, and one who receives it from a gentile.

Now this part branches out further into two branches.

The first: that the predicates are asserted of their subjects on one equal footing;

the second: that one of them is asserted by way of novelty and the other as a matter already known.

For example: "The firstborn [animal] — one may sell it, when blemished, alive or slaughtered" [ed. Mishnah Ma'aser Sheni 1:2: תמים חי, ובעל מום חי ושחוט, "unblemished — alive; blemished — alive and slaughtered"; 1742 prints only the second clause].

Now its sale alive is already known to be permitted, for even in the case of unblemished ones it is permitted; only its sale slaughtered is the novelty, since that was not permitted for those.

Now in this branch two ways are found.

The first is that the known comes first and afterward the novel is mentioned; and this is called "not only this but even this" (לא זו אף זו), and it is like the example we mentioned: alive or slaughtered.

The second is that the novel is mentioned first and afterward the known; and this is called "this — and needless to say this" (זו ואין צריך לומר זו); for example: "They are permitted for eating, and all the more so for benefit."

The second part of this kind is that it is asserted of one subject that it is suspended between two predicates, and it is not allowed that one of them alone be found in it;

for example: "He either performs chalitzah or performs levirate marriage."

Now this kind as a whole is called a "compound" statement (marbeh ha-inyanim), since it multiplies the predicates or the subjects.

The eighth kind — in which one predicate is asserted of a subject by negating another predicate or subject;

for example (Terumot) [ed. Mishnah Terumot 11:5]: "He shall not let the remainder be lost, but rather shall put it in a concealed place."

The ninth kind — in which one predicate is asserted of a subject while there is in it another predicate that on the face of it contradicts it;

for example (Maasrot, chapter 4) [ed. Mishnah Ma'asrot 5:8]: "Even though their parent [plant] is terumah, these may be eaten";

for now, their parent's being terumah on the face of it contradicts the permission to eat the growths [from those seeds], but in truth it is not so.

The tenth kind — in which a matter is asserted by likeness to another matter;

for example (Demai 17) [ed. Mishnah Demai 6:5]: "Just as they divide the non-sacred produce, so they divide the terumah."

Now in this you will see that a known matter is always taken and another, unknown one is equated to it.

For example, in the statement we mentioned: now their division of the non-sacred produce is known, and the division of the terumah was equated to it as well, and it asserted that they are equal in the case of one who receives olive trees [as a sharecropper] for the oil;

and this is called a comparative statement.

The eleventh kind — in which a predicate is asserted that is consequent upon another predicate;

for example (Maasrot 61) [ed. Mishnah Ma'asrot 2:1; the mishnah reads טלו לכם תאנים, "take figs for yourselves," where 1742 prints טלו כלם]: "If one was passing through the market and said, 'Take them all'," etc., "therefore, if they brought them into their houses, they must tithe them as certainly [untithed]."

What you must further know is that now people have many ways of expressing in their language what they think in their thought;

for now some are lengthy in their words and some are brief in them; some speak by way of report, some by way of rhetorical question, and some by way of allusion.

All these divisions have already been explained by the masters of grammar and rhetoric;

but what we need now is this: that every utterance that is uttered, in whatever order and manner it may be, when we get to the bottom of its speaker's intent we shall certainly find that he intended by it the assertion of a predicate of a subject;

for otherwise there would be no substance in his utterance, and no complete conception would be formed from it in the intellect of his hearer.

Therefore do not set your mind on the manner of the utterance but on the statement intended by it.

If you see that the utterance is brief, complete it in your thought; and if you see that it is long, remove from it what is superfluous.

And conceive in your thought nothing but the subject of which he speaks, the predicate he asserts of it, and the manner in which he asserts it, as I wrote above.

When you find in the Talmud (Pesachim 7): "There, how should we say? Should we say 'to circumcise'? Must it necessarily be he who circumcises?" (לא סגיא דלאו איהו מהל) —

now this is abbreviated wording and by way of rhetorical questions,

but the intent in it is: that there one can bless only "concerning circumcision," because there is no room there to say "to circumcise," since it is not necessary that he be the one who circumcises.

And it follows that this is what you must conceive in your thought out of all those words;

and likewise when it went on to say, "The father of the child — what is there to say?" (מאי איכא למימר), the intent is that the father of the child must say "to circumcise," according to what it posited there at the outset;

and when it answered, "Yes, indeed so" (אין הכי נמי), the intent is that such is the truth, that is, that the father of the child must say "to circumcise."

And in this manner you shall judge all wordings whatsoever.