Chapter 8 · פרק ח

We have already explained the understanding of statements and the generation of conclusions; now we shall explain the acceptance of opinions or their denial.

Any statement that we hear we may accept, we may deny, or we may remain in doubt about:

a statement for which a proof of its truth comes to us — we accept it; a statement for which we have a proof of its falsity — we deny it; and one for which we have no proof either of its truth or of its falsity — we remain in doubt.

The proof of the truth of a statement divides into three kinds: proof from nature, proof from convention, and proof from syllogism.

Proof from nature is that the statement be one of the things that are verified for everyone by nature, or be founded on one of these things;

for there are two kinds of matters that are verified in themselves and need no other proof, and they are: the first intelligibles (axioms) and the sensibles (sense perceptions).

The first intelligibles are the matters which a man's intellect teaches of itself, for which he needs no learning, and about which no one of sound intellect is in doubt.

For example: that two is more than one, that the half is less than the whole. Likewise everything of the like.

The sensibles are what the senses attest to, such as that a stone is hard, that water is wet.

For example, when they said (Sukkah 40) "wood is excluded [from the sanctity of the Sabbatical year] — for its benefit comes after its burning":

now the truth of this statement becomes clear to us from the senses, for with our own eyes we see, and we perceive, that there is no benefit from wood except after it has been burned. Likewise everything of the like.

Proof from convention is that the statement be something on which the opinion of the generality of men agrees, or be founded on this; for then that statement will be verified for anyone who belongs to that generality.

And this divides into two kinds: the first — the class of commonly accepted opinions (endoxa), and the second — received traditions.

Commonly accepted opinions are those on which the opinion of most men agrees, by virtue of their being human;

for example, that pride is blameworthy and that humility is praiseworthy. Likewise everything of the like.

Received traditions are what has been handed down by tradition from the fathers and the teachers; and included in this, for us, are all the Sacred Writings, every halachah given to Moses at Sinai, and all the thirteen hermeneutic principles by which the Torah is expounded, together with all their rules.

Thus a statement is verified for us when there is found one of the verses, or one of the oral halachot, or one of the statements of those with whom we cannot dispute, that verifies our statement.

For example, when we learned [in the Mishnah] (Yevamot 40): "if there is a father," etc., they said in the Talmud on this: "for the Master said: a father takes precedence over all who issue from his loins."

Likewise, when they said (Sanhedrin 90): "All Israel have a share in the World to Come," they verified this statement by means of the verse, as it is stated: "And your people are all righteous; they shall inherit the land forever." Likewise everything of the like.

Proof from syllogism is that it become clear to us that our statement is a true conclusion of a verified premise, namely, that this statement is generated by and follows from another statement that is verified for us;

and this by force of one of the syllogisms explained above, namely: the classical syllogism, the analogism (mah matzinu), the a fortiori argument, the hypothetical syllogism, and the disjunctive syllogism.

And you must know that just as a statement is verified if a proof of it comes to us, it is verified if a proof comes to us that its opposite is false.

For this is of the rule of opposites: when one is negated, the other is affirmed — provided they are not among those between which there is an intermediate, for then there are two that must be negated for the third to be affirmed.

Now I shall show you one example of proof from demonstration. They said in the Talmud (Yevamot 66): "From where [is it derived] that when a priest marries a woman, she eats terumah? — for it is stated: 'And if a priest buys any soul,'" etc.

Now the statement was that a priest's wife eats terumah, and the proof of this is by force of demonstration: for it has already been verified for us that the purchase of the priest's money eats terumah, and this by force of the verse, which states so explicitly, "And if a priest buys any soul," etc.;

and we know likewise that the priest's wife is the purchase of his money, since a woman is acquired with money; if so, it is necessary that she eat terumah.

They further said (Horayot 2) [ed. Horayot 9a]: "Why is it different, that the Merciful One wrote it at the end? To say that [whoever is liable for this] is liable for all of them; for if it should enter your mind that one becomes liable for one even though he does not become liable for all of them, let the Merciful One have written this ['one'] in [the section on] poverty, or alternatively in [the section on] wealth."

Now here the statement was that only one who obtains atonement through one obtains atonement through all of them.

And a proof of this was brought by force of a demonstration of this form: if one who does not obtain atonement through one were also to obtain atonement through all of them, the verse would have said "one" with respect to poverty or with respect to wealth;

and since we see that the verse said it neither with respect to poverty nor with respect to wealth, it is therefore necessary that one who does not obtain atonement through one does not obtain atonement through all of them; rather, one who obtains atonement through one obtains atonement through all of them.

And this is by means of the hypothetical syllogism that we mentioned above. And so with all the other syllogisms.

The proof that a statement is false proceeds likewise in three ways, namely from nature, from convention, and from syllogism.

From nature: when one of the matters verified by nature, which we mentioned, is found to disprove the statement.

For example (Berachot) [ed. Berachot 58b]: "We have it by tradition that [a comet] does not pass [through Orion]" — when they brought a proof against the statement by force of the senses and said: "But we see that it does pass!"

From convention: when a verse or a statement that cannot be disputed is found to disprove the statement.

For example, when they said: "'all your males' — to include the minors," they brought a proof against this from the Mishnah: "But we have learned [in the Mishnah] (והא אנן תנן): except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor."

Likewise, when they said (Bava Kamma 83): "[if] he blinded his eye, we view him as if he were a slave being sold in the market," they brought a proof against this from the verse: "But it is written: 'And if a man strikes any human being, he shall surely be put to death'; 'an eye for an eye,'" etc.

From syllogism: when we see that the opposite of the statement, or its variant, is a true conclusion from a verified premise;

or when we see a conclusion issue from the statement whose falsity is well known, for then we judge that of necessity the premise too is false.

And this by force of the hypothetical syllogism that we mentioned above; for once it has become clear to us that that conclusion is a consequent of our statement, then it is of the rule of antecedent and consequent that, in the absence of the consequent, the absence of the antecedent follows necessarily.

For example, when they said (ibid.): "Say [it means] actual death," they disproved this line of reasoning (sevara) by force of this proof: "It should not enter your mind (לא סלקא דעתך), for it is juxtaposed [in Scripture] to one who strikes an animal."

Now here they disproved the explanation of actual death, because its variant, which is money, is a conclusion from a true premise, namely, that one who strikes an animal is [liable] only in money;

and this by way of the analogism (mah matzinu), which we mentioned above, founded on one of the received traditions that we hold, which is that subjects juxtaposed to one another in the verses are learned from one another.

Now we say: one who strikes an animal is [liable] only in money; one who strikes a limb of a man is learned from one who strikes an animal, since it is juxtaposed to it; if so, one who strikes a limb of a man is [liable] only in money.

Thus this explanation stands affirmed, and the explanation "death" is disproved of itself.

And when they said: "The verse says, 'so shall it be given to him' — and 'giving' means nothing but money," they brought a proof against this, saying: "But then (אלא מעתה), 'as he gives a blemish in a man' — is this too money?"

Now the statement was that wherever "giving" is written, it means money. From this issues the conclusion that when the verse says "as he gives a blemish in a man," this too is money, since this too is the language of giving — and this is something whose falsity is well known. If so, the premise is certainly false.

And this is by force of the hypothetical syllogism, as follows: if every "giving" in the Torah is money, then "as he gives a blemish in a man" is also money; "as he gives a blemish" is certainly not money; therefore not every "giving" in the Torah is money.

There is also a kind of disproving demonstration whose force is very strong. It consists in our setting out all the ways in which the statement could be interpreted, and showing that it is false in all of them.

For example, they said in the Talmud (Bava Kamma 29): "R. Acha said: such as where it [the camel] crossed through water by way of the sloping bank of the river," and they disproved this by saying: "What are the circumstances (היכי דמי)? If there is another way — he is negligent; if there is no other way — he is under compulsion [and exempt]."

And this is also called a dilemma (ממה נפשך, "either way").

However, both the verifying proof and the disproof are rebutted if it is found that the matter is not as it was mentioned in the proof — namely, that the intelligible, or the sense, or the commonly accepted opinion, or the tradition, or the verse does not verify it or does not disprove it.

And likewise the syllogism — or else the syllogism is rebutted and its conclusion nullified.

For example, when they brought a proof for the statement of R. Yehudah, who said: "One who injures his own Canaanite slave — is exempt," from the verse "When brothers strive together" [ed. Deuteronomy 25:11: כי ינצו אנשים יחדו איש ואחיו, "when men strive together, a man and his brother"; 1742 prints אחים] — "a slave is excluded, since he has no brotherhood" —

they rebutted the proof, on the view of the Sages, by saying: "He is his brother in the commandments," and it turns out that this verse does not exempt him.

Likewise, when one wished to disprove the statement "It is a received tradition that it [the comet] does not pass through Kesil [Orion]" by force of the sense, by saying: "But we see that it passes!" — they rebutted the disproof by saying: "It is its glow that passes," namely, that the sense does not disprove this statement.

And when they wished to demonstrate by force of an a fortiori argument that the prince [nasi] brings a suspensive guilt offering, they rebutted the a fortiori argument by saying: "Let the anointed [High Priest] prove [otherwise]" (משיח יוכיח), and the conclusion turns out to be nullified.

And what rebuts it — the disproving demonstration — is when we turn back upon the disputant's opinion the very same difficulty that he raised against our statement, or another difficulty by which it appears that the disputant's opinion too is disproved, in such a way that the disputant himself must of necessity agree to some condition or distinction by which his opinion and ours escape the difficulty that appeared in them;

and this is called "and according to your reasoning" (ולטעמך) or "and according to you" (ולדידך).

For example, when they raised a difficulty in the Talmud (Bava Kamma 88): "But if so (אלא מעתה), according to the Rabbis a slave should be fit for kingship!" — they answered this: "They say: and according to your reasoning, a convert should pose a difficulty for you according to all opinions! Rather, the verse says: 'from among your brothers' — from the choicest among your brothers."

Stronger still than this is when we remove the difficulty from our statement and cast it upon the opinion of the one who disputes with us, or when the proof that he brought to disprove our statement we turn back into a proof for our statement;

and this is called "just the opposite" (אדרבא), or "that proves my point" (היא הנותנת), "from there is a proof" (משם ראיה).

For example, when they raised a difficulty in the Talmud (ibid. 83): "We derive damages from damages, and we do not derive damages from death," they answered: "Just the opposite! We derive [the law of] a man from [that of] a man, and we do not derive [the law of] a man from [that of] an animal."

And when R. Meir brought a proof for his words (Shabbat 82) from the verse "to rake fire from the hearth," he [R. Yosei] answered him: "From there is a proof?! — [the verse continues:] 'and to draw water from the cistern.'"

Now whenever the verifying proof is rebutted, the statement reverts to being doubtful, if there is no disproof against it; and likewise when the disproof is rebutted, it reverts to being doubtful, if there is no verifying proof for it.

However, there is another kind of proof, which neither verifies completely nor disproves completely, but inclines the mind to one of the sides, and this is called sevara (plausible reasoning).

It is so called when the arguments are evenly balanced for yes and for no, except that the mind inclines more toward one side than toward the side opposite it.

For example (Chullin 19): "There are those who say: he may even turn back [the windpipe and gullet, in pinching a bird offering]; and there are those who say: he turns them back [and only so] — and it stands to reason (מסתברא) like the one who says: he may even turn back."

Among the things you need to know is that, for the proofs to be true and the conclusions to be true, there must be a correct statement of relation between all the generating statements and the conclusions, the verifying and the verified, the disproved and the disproving — that they be similar to one another.

This is because in any subject whatsoever it is impossible that many aspects should not be discerned in it, whether in what concerns the essence of the subject or in what concerns its being related to others.

And the predicates that are asserted of it may be asserted of it according to all that is in its essence, or according to part of what is in its essence, or according to some one of its relations.

We have already found, among the kinds of statements, the statement that is according to one aspect, which rests on this principle.

For example, they said in the Talmud (Pesachim 20) [ed. Pesachim 19b]: "The Temple courtyard is a public domain."

Now this statement is not to be understood absolutely, that the courtyard is a public domain in all aspects, but only with respect to doubtful impurity;

and a statement made according to one aspect you must not make into a premise for a conclusion in another aspect, for the similarity and equivalence between them are not true but only apparent.

Thus it turns out that you cannot derive from the statement we mentioned, "The Temple courtyard is a public domain," that one who carries within it on the Sabbath beyond four cubits is liable, since it is a public domain only with respect to impurity, while with respect to the Sabbath it is a private domain.

Likewise, you cannot disprove a statement that says it is a private domain on the strength of this statement we mentioned, since the one who says "private domain" speaks with respect to the Sabbath, and this statement with respect to impurity. And likewise with everything similar to this.

You need to know that the aspects that can be discerned in any given subject total four: its essence, its proprium, its accident, and its relation.

Its essence is that on which the being of that subject truly depends, such that were it absent, that subject would not be what it is. For example: the knife — it is its being a cutting instrument.

Its proprium is a matter that always accompanies the subject and does not depart from it, yet the being of the subject does not depend on it; for if one were to conceive its absence, the subject would not cease to be what it is.

For example, when they said (Mishnah Parah 3) [ed. Mishnah Parah 9:3]: "[Creeping creatures do not disqualify the water of purification,] except for the weasel, because it laps" — now this is something always found in the weasel, that it laps, yet its being a weasel does not depend on this.

Its accident is what accompanies the subject by way of accident — that is, it could have been that it did not accompany it, or that a matter different from this accompanied it, even one opposite to it, and nevertheless that subject would be what it is.

This is what concerns the form of the subject or its measure — that is, its being round or square, long or short. For the round thing could have been square, the square thing could have been round, the long could have been short and the short could have been long, and that subject would not thereby have been a different subject.

Its relation is a matter that is not in it on its own account at all, but only because it is joined and related to another.

For example: its being similar or dissimilar — this is not a matter discerned in the subject in itself, but only insofar as it is set in comparison with another; [so too] its acting or its being acted upon, and likewise the like — matters that are not completed in the existence of one subject alone, but only in the existence of different subjects, by their being related to one another.

However, in whatever aspect it may be, a predicate may be asserted of a subject, and we do not on that account judge that very predicate [to hold] of that very subject in another aspect.

For example, they said in the Sifrei (parashat Naso): "When the light prohibition came upon the light prohibition, it made forbidden those who forbade it," etc. [ed. Sifrei Bamidbar 7: כשבא אסור הקל על אסור הקלה, "upon the lightly prohibited [woman]"; 1742 prints הקל twice] —

that is: a married woman is called a light prohibition relative to his mother-in-law, in that she has a permission [she can become permitted], which is not so with his mother-in-law. Now from another side a married woman is more severe than his mother-in-law — for the former is by strangulation and the latter by excision.

However, in the aspect of her having a permission a married woman is called light, and in the aspect of punishment a married woman is called severe.

Further, you need to know that a predicate may be asserted of a subject in potentiality, and it may be asserted in actuality — that is, we may say that that predicate is in actuality in that subject.

For example, they said (Zevachim 91) [ed. Zevachim 99a]: "A priest who sprinkles [the blood of the sin-offering] takes a share, and one who does not sprinkle does not take a share". And they raised the difficulty: "Is this a general rule? But there is the entire watch [of priests], who do not sprinkle, yet they take a share!" And they resolved: "We are speaking of one fit for sprinkling!"

This is because the questioner at first understood "a priest who sprinkles" as one who sprinkles in actuality, and against this he brought a proof contrary to this statement from the prevailing practice, that the members of the watch do not sprinkle in actuality and nevertheless take a share;

and the answerer resolved that "sprinkles" here is not to be understood as in actuality but in potentiality and in readiness — that is, one who is fit for sprinkling — and the members of the watch are all fit for sprinkling.

However, all these divisions and distinctions must be observed in all dialectic investigation; then it will be true and correct.

Now up to here we have explained the acceptance of statements or their denial according as the intellect agrees with them or does not agree, from the side of their matter.

But there is a further way in which it agrees or does not agree with a statement — not from the side of its matter, but from the side of its report.

This is in two ways: the one, from the report as a whole; the second, from its parts.

From the report as a whole: it is a rule of a proper account that the account should have some use, and that there be nothing superfluous or repeated in it.

On the basis of this principle, if we hear an account whose report appears to us unnecessary, we raise the difficulty against it: "It is obvious!" (פשיטא), since a thing that is commonly known and known to all need not be reported.

The resolution of this difficulty comes when we find that there is room to think contrary to what is reported to us, and this is called "it might have entered our mind" (סלקא דעתן).

From the parts of the report: it is likewise a rule of the account that in no part of it should there be anything superfluous or repeated without need; and it is likewise its rule that its order be proper and fitting, in dividing what needs to be divided and joining what needs to be joined.

If we find in a statement the lack of one of these conditions, we raise a difficulty against it according to what we find lacking in it.

For example: when we find the words to be ill-fitting, we raise against it: "This itself is difficult!" (הא גופא קשיא).

When we find that the arrangement is not proper, we raise a difficulty against it according to what is lacking in it.

For example (Berachot 2): "Where does the Tanna stand [that he teaches 'From when']?" (תנא היכא קאי); "Let him combine them and teach them together" (ליערבינהו ולתנינהו) [ed. Gittin 80b; 1742 places both under ברכות ב']. (Bava Kamma 27): "He opened with a jug and closed with a barrel?" (פתח בכד וסים בחבית) — and the like.

All these are natural foundations engraved in our intellect, upon which the structures of study and inquiry are built, and all the sugyot of the Talmud in all their parts.

Now we will explain the parts of the sugyot in particular, which are the totality of the structures built upon these foundations.