Chapter 4 · פרק ד

Now, up to this point we have explained what is understood from statements, each one on its own; now we shall explain what is understood from comparing one statement with another statement.

In respect of their comparison and relation, statements divide into ten kinds, and they are: equivalent statements, variant statements and opposites, converses, obverses, and incongruent statements.

Equivalent statements are two statements that assert one predicate of one and the same subject, except that in the manner of assertion and the order of the wording they differ;

or that assert one predicate, or two similar predicates, of two similar subjects; or that assert two similar predicates of one subject.

For example, when they said (Ketubot 37) [ed. Ketubot 36b]: "R. Yehudah and R. Dosa said one thing; R. Yehudah — that which we have stated [in the Mishnah]; R. Dosa — as it is taught [in a baraita]: a captive woman may eat terumah," etc.

Now, although their words are not identical, you will find that their intent is one.

Likewise when they said (Pesachim 45) [ed. Pesachim 82b; there: R. Nechemyah, where 1742 prints ר' נחמן]: "R. Yochanan ben Beroka and R. Nachman said one thing," etc., and it concludes there: "But acute mourning is like [a disqualification that arises] after the sprinkling [of the blood]," etc.

Now the two matters there are not one, but similar to one another.

Variant statements are two statements that assert of one subject two differing predicates, or one predicate of two differing subjects.

For example (Ketubot 57): "R. Tarfon says: they give her all [of her sustenance as] terumah; R. Akiva says: half non-sacred produce, half terumah."

Opposites are [statements] that, regarding one predicate of one subject, say — the one yes and the other no.

For example (Yevamot 50): "Rabban Gamliel says: there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce, nor levirate betrothal [ma'amar] after levirate betrothal; and the Sages say: there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce, and there is levirate betrothal after levirate betrothal."

However, for them to be called opposites, their predicate must be one and their subject one, and they must be understood — at one time, in one place, in one respect, and in the plain sense, without any equivocation or figurative usage.

That is: now, the statement "A woman may not go out with a frontlet nor with pendants" and the statement "A woman may go out with a frontlet and with pendants" are not opposites, because the one is [speaking] of when they are not sewn on, and the other of when they are sewn on;

likewise "not with a kavul [a woolen cap]" together with "she may go out with a kavul" are not opposites, because they are not in one place, for the one is [speaking] of the public domain and the other of a courtyard; and so too with the other conditions that we have mentioned.

Likewise the statement "And if he drove [it] in, he is liable to a sin-offering" is not opposite to the statement "Blowing is a skill and not a labor," because the meaning of the first is the driving-in [teki'ah] of the hinge-pin into its socket, and the meaning of the second is the blowing [teki'ah] of the shofar.

And you must know that among the opposites themselves there are diametrically opposed statements, which are [opposed] from one extreme to the other, and there are some that are not opposites to that degree, yet in any case contradict one another, and these are called contradictory statements.

Two categorical statements or two particular statements, of which one affirms and one negates — one predicate of one subject — are opposites from one extreme to the other.

For example (Shabbat 124): "All vessels may be moved, for a purpose and not for a purpose; R. Nechemiah says: they may be moved only for a purpose."

These two statements are diametrically opposed, for both are categorical.

"R. Eliezer says [of a wick made from a garment]: it is impure, and one may not light with it; R. Akiva says: it is pure, and one may light with it" (ibid. 28) — diametrically opposed, for both are particular.

But the statement (ibid. 76): "and they combine with one another… except for their peels," together with the statement "R. Yehudah says: except for the peels of lentils," are not opposites but contradictory statements,

for the first Tanna said of peels that they do not combine with the food, while R. Yehudah says of the peels of lentils alone that they do combine with the food —

and so the statement of the first Tanna turns out to be categorical and the statement of R. Yehudah particular, and R. Yehudah would indeed concede to the first Tanna regarding the other particulars included in the class of peels.

And you must know further that just as negation and affirmation are opposites, so too two matters are opposites when the intent of each of them is the negation of the other.

For example: impure and pure are opposites, for the intent of the word "impure" is the negation of purity, and the intent of "pure" is the negation of impurity.

However, you must know that there are opposites between which there is an intermediate, and opposites between which there is no intermediate.

For example: impure and pure, forbidden and permitted — there is no intermediate between them; but optional and obligatory have an intermediate between them, namely the mitzvah [a commended but not binding act].

There are, further, statements of which one is the exact converse of the other, that is, what is the subject in the one is the predicate in the other, and what is the predicate in the one is the subject in the other.

For example, when you say (Yerushalmi) [ed. Yerushalmi Shabbat 13:3]: "No transgression is a mitzvah; no mitzvah is a transgression."

Now in the first, "transgression" is the subject and "mitzvah" the predicate, and in the second the reverse.

However, this conversion can take place in three ways.

The first: that the order changes, that is, the subject and the predicate, while the quantity remains — that is, if it was categorical it remains categorical, and if particular, particular — and likewise the quality, that is, if it was affirmative it remains affirmative, and if negative it remains negative;

for example, the two statements we have mentioned: "No transgression is a mitzvah; no mitzvah is a transgression."

The second: that the order changes and the quantity as well, but the quality is maintained;

for example, the statement "Whoever does not eat [terumah] does not enable [others] to eat" with the statement "There is one who does not enable [others] to eat and does not eat," for the first is categorical and the second partial.

The third: that the order and the quality change while the quantity remains;

an example: "Whoever eats enables [others] to eat" with the statement "Whoever does not enable [others] to eat does not eat."

Obverse statements are those whose predicates and subjects are both opposites, and so their matter turns out to be one.

For example: "Whoever eats enables [others] to eat; whoever does not eat does not enable [others] to eat."

But statements that have no shared relation at all — that is, neither their subjects nor their predicates are one, nor are they similar at all — are called incongruent.