Chapter 9 · פרק ט

Now the parts of the sugyot in general we have already mentioned, and they are: statement (meimra), question, answer, contradiction (setirah), proof, difficulty (kushya), and resolution (terutz).

Now we shall mention their particulars and explain their rules.

The statement divides into four parts: the first, firsthand statement (shemua); the second, explanation; the third, inference (diyuk); the fourth, report.

The question divides into two: the first, query; the second, question of principle (ibbaya).

The answer, likewise, into two: the first, the answer to a query; the second, the answer to a question of principle, and it is called determination (peshitut).

The proof divides into two: the first, demonstration, and the second, validation (siyata).

The contradiction divides into two: the first, direct contradiction, and the second, opposition (dechiyah).

The difficulty divides into three: the first, objection (pirka); the second, apparent contradiction (rumya, a clash); the third, refutation (teyuvta).

The resolution divides into two: the first, settlement; the second, alternative (shinuya).

The firsthand statement is when a speaker says a statement by which he makes known one of the matters—something from the halachot, or from the ethical teachings, or of whatever kind of intelligible it may be.

For example (Berachot) [ed. Berachot 20b: אמר רב אדא בר אהבה, "Rav Adda bar Ahavah said"; 1742 prints רבי אליעזר]: "R. Eliezer said: Women are obligated in the sanctification of the day [kiddush] by Torah law";

and its rules are the rules of statements, which we explained in the third chapter.

The explanation is when one explains one of the verses or one of the statements.

For example, when R. Yehoshua ben Levi said (Berachot 22): "What is the nature of those who immerse in the morning?"—it was afterward explained [in the Gemara]: "This is what he is saying (הכי קאמר): what is the nature of [their immersing] in forty se'ah, when it is possible with nine kav?" and so on.

However, the rule of the explanation is that, besides its agreeing with the truth in the essence of its matter, it must agree with the statement being explained according to its words and the order of its report;

but if it agrees completely with the statement, it is called a full explanation (perush meruvach),

and if it agrees with the core of the statement but does not fit well with all the words or with all the order, so that we are compelled to say that the author of the statement did not speak with precision, it is called a forced explanation (perush dachuk).

And if it does not agree with the statement at all, we reject it entirely.

Now under this heading is included the manner of elucidation called presumption (okimta, a case-restriction), which is an elucidation of a condition within the statement, namely, that we do not elucidate the report and its words at all but leave them in their plain sense; rather, we confine the statement to one of the conditions,

which is when we say: "With what are we dealing here?" (הכא במאי עסקינן) or: "Whose [view] is this? It is R. So-and-so's" (הא מני, ר' פלוני היא).

For example (Berachot 2) [ed. the formula does not occur on Berachot 2a–b; it stands three times on Berachot 26a]: "With what are we dealing here?", and likewise (ibid. 24): "They taught this only where he is able to direct his heart," and so on.

The inference is when one infers from a statement or from a verse what is not made explicit in it, as I mentioned above.

For example, on the Mishnah "One who has had a seminal emission ponders [the Shema] in his heart"—"Rava said: This is to say that pondering is like speech" [ed. Berachot 20b: אמר רבינא, "Ravina said"; 1742 prints רבא]—and its rules were explained in the fifth chapter.

The report is when one relates an incident or a statement of someone else; that is, when one relates what another felt, on his view, of the difficulties or of the resolutions.

For example, when they said (Shabbat 19) [ed. Shabbat 19a: the report there is R. Tzadok's, "such was the custom of the house of Rabban Gamliel"; 1742 prints רבי יהושע בן לוי]: "R. Yehoshua ben Levi said," and so on,

and when they said (Bava Kamma 83): "A further difficulty troubled him: what did you see [to derive it from the one verse rather than the other]?" and so on—there the Talmud reports what the Tanna felt, on his view, in its own words.

The query is when a questioner asks about a matter—whether it is so or not—or about some condition of it, such as about place, or about time, or about a reason, and the like.

For example (Yevamot 102): "I said to him: Are you acquainted with R. Yehudah ben Beteira?"

Likewise, when they said (Berachot 35): "How does one bless [over fruits]?" and so on;

and likewise when they said (Yevamot 112): "What is different about a deaf-mute man and a deaf-mute woman... and what is different about an imbecile?" and so on.

The question of principle is when a questioner asks about a matter that has grounds on two sides, and seeks a decision for one of them.

For example: "Rav Chiya bar Yosef asked Shmuel: A High Priest who betrothed a minor girl and she reached full maturity under him—what [is the law]? Do we go by the marriage?" and so on.

The answer is that one answers the query according to what it is: if he asked about the existence of a matter, whether it is so or not, he answers him yes or no; and if he sought a reason, he answers him with the reason.

For example, to the question "Are you acquainted..." and so on, he answered: yes; to the question "What is different about a deaf-mute..." and so on, he answered: "A deaf-mute man and a deaf-mute woman, for whom the enactment holds," and so on; and so with the rest.

And its rule is that it be an answer corresponding to the query, and that it be true.

The determination is that one decides for one of the two sides of the question of principle.

For example, on the question of principle concerning a High Priest who betrothed, and so on, Shmuel determined it: "that we go by the marriage."

And its rule is like the rule of the answer.

The demonstration is when one brings a proof to demonstrate the truth of a statement that has been said.

For example (Pesachim) [ed. Pesachim 16a]: "R. Eliezer said: There is no impurity for liquids at all; know [this is so], for Yosei ben Yo'ezer testified," and so on.

Likewise, when they asked: "From where are these words [derived]?" (מנא הני מילי) and answered: "As the Sages taught" (דתנו רבנן), and so on.

And its rule is that it demonstrate the truth of the statement by necessity, according to the laws of necessary proof that I explained; however, we can also demonstrate by force of a sevara, but it is not as strong.

The validation is that a statement is brought which agrees with another statement, to strengthen the opinion stated in it.

For example (Yevamot 102): "For it was taught in accordance with Rava (דתניא כותיה): If she performed chalitzah with a shoe that has come unstitched... her chalitzah is valid."

And its rule is like the rule of the demonstration.

The direct contradiction is when one contradicts a statement that has been said, or a proof that has been brought, and shows it to be annulled.

For example: "Even according to the one who says that the impurity of liquids is by Torah law," and so on; "Rav Ashi said to him," and so on; "and if it is a halachah they hold by tradition, can we derive from it?"

Here he contradicted Rav Pappa's firsthand statement absolutely, by force of the demonstration (מופת) he brought against it.

Now the rule of the direct contradiction is that it contradict with strong force, according to the rules of disproof that I explained above.

The opposition is when one deflects the necessity of the statement, but does not annul its matter entirely and does not deny its possibility.

For example, when they said: "Is it not [so]?" (מאי לאו), they answered: "No." Likewise, when they said: "But perhaps" (ודלמא) and "Say [rather]" (אימא)—this is a sign of opposition to the necessity of the statement that was said.

Now as for the opposition, it suffices that it deflect the necessity even though the statement remains possible, and then the statement remains doubtful and non-necessary.

However, in any case it is required that what it sets up have a footing in the subject about which we are judging, and not be something far-fetched in the extreme; for if it were so, the statement would remain upheld by force of sevara, as I mentioned above.

The objection is when something unfitting is found in the order of the statement or in its report.

For example, when they said: "This itself is difficult" (הא גופא קשיא). Or when they said: "Two say he died... what is he teaching us? (מאי קא משמע לן)... it is the very same thing" (היינו הך).

Likewise, there (Yevamot 118): "And let R. Meir disagree in the first clause?"

And likewise everything of this kind: difficulties concerning the orderings of statements or the need for the report, as a whole or in their parts.

The apparent contradiction is when two statements or two verses that are opposite or contradictory are brought, in order to seek their settlement.

For example (Yevamot 121) [ed. Yevamot 120b]: "And set against it (ורמינהי): A person does not impart impurity," and so on.

Likewise, when they said: "R. Ya'akov bar Idi raised an apparent contradiction: It is written, 'And behold, I am with you' [Genesis 28:15]," and so on.

The settlement is when the objection or the apparent contradiction is resolved with a correct and true settlement, which the answerer believes to be the truth of the matter.

For example, when R. Ya'akov bar Idi resolved his apparent contradiction: "He thought [that perhaps sin would be the cause]", and so on.

And its rule is that it be true in itself, and agree with the statement on account of which it comes.

The alternative is when the difficulty or the apparent contradiction is resolved by something in which the answerer's intention is not absolutely that this is the truth of the matter, but only that it deflect the difficulty.

Now this is in truth similar to the opposition, except that the opposition is against a statement that was laid down or [a proof] that was brought, while the alternative is an opposition against a difficulty.

For example, when they raised a difficulty against Rava, saying (Yevamot 104): "A deaf-mute man who underwent chalitzah... what is the reason? Is it not because they are not capable of recitation?"—they deflected it and said: "No, [it is] because they are not possessed of understanding."

And the rule of the alternative is that it must be able to agree with the statement on account of which it was brought, even if we must posit in it some strangeness and deficiency, or something unfitting, on the grounds that the author of the statement was not so precise in his words.

But the more deficiency we must posit in it, the more forced the alternative will be; and if the strangeness grows so great that its words truly cannot bear it, we give it no place at all.