Chapter 10 · פרק י

Now, thus far we have explained the parts of the sugyot and what is intended in them.

At this point we shall explain the order of study in them, so as to apprehend each thing according to what it is.

I have already set out for you that the ways of reporting and the modes of speech are many; but this arises from various causes:

The first: that human nature dictates that each one should have his own individual and distinctive way of stating his thoughts and expressing what is in his heart, as in all the other matters, the natures varying among men according to their temperaments, their character, and the inclination of their intellect.

The second: what the art of rhetoric teaches, in order to make the report pleasant and to beautify it, or to ease understanding for the hearers and to bring the words into their hearts.

The third: what the custom of the generations or of the lands brings about; for there are those who were accustomed to speak in one way and those who were accustomed to speak in another way. And for the most part, men learn to speak according to the custom of their place in their time.

This is one of the things required of every reader of any composition: that he strive to understand the language of that author and his manner of reporting —

for what, according to one of the languages or modes of speech, points us to one matter, so that we derive from it one understanding, may, according to another language and another mode, point us to a matter very different from this, so that we derive from it an understanding far removed from the other.

Now, when you come to study one of the sugyot, begin with it little by little, and every utterance you read from it, reflect on it first until you discern its parts well, namely: the subject, the predicate, and the way in which that matter — namely, the predicate — is said of that subject.

But whatever form the utterance may take, you must conceive it in your thought in the straightforward form of statements.

That is: if you find the statement in the manner of a rhetorical question, or in the manner of a difficulty, or in whatever manner it may be, then extract the gist of its intent in your thought, namely, the matter that the author of that statement wished to say and the subject of which he wished to say that matter; and then conceive it in your intellect in the straightforward form, which is: such-and-such a subject has in it such-and-such a matter.

For example: when you find the utterance "The father of the son — what is there to say?" — now this utterance is in the manner of a difficulty, and when you extract the gist of its intent you will find that it means to say that the father of the son must say [in his blessing] "to circumcise the son"; this is the straightforward form of this statement, and thus you should conceive it in your thought.

However, after you have recognized the statement in its parts, you must then reflect so as to recognize what the purpose is in saying that statement: whether it is a matter on its own, namely, to make known that that matter is in that subject, or to ask whether a certain matter is in a certain subject; or whether it is joined and related to another statement that has been said,

and then it will be either to explain it, or to demonstrate it, or to raise a difficulty against it, or to resolve a difficulty that was raised against it, or to answer a question.

When you find and recognize the purpose of its intent, you must then reflect on how it truly accords with that purpose; that is, how by force of this statement the first one is explained, or we demonstrate it, or it becomes clear that there is a difficulty in it, or the difficulty is removed from it, or there is an answer to the question.

However, among the things on which you must reflect is this: that every statement and every premise must be verified, as I mentioned above.

But the verification of a single statement will at times come by force of many demonstrations following one after another.

For you will find one premise verifying one statement, and that premise is verified by force of another premise, and the other by another, until the thing reaches those that are verified in and of themselves, or the convention that I explained above;

and then we go back in reverse over all the premises we have mentioned, up to the first, for we say: if the third is true, it is necessary that the first be true, since they all depend on one another — and this holds both in positing and in raising difficulties.

Now it turns out that there are the statements, and the proofs of the statements, and the proofs of the proofs, and the proofs of the proofs of the proofs; and in this way the thing can be drawn out and proceed at great length, and these things are often said in a brief manner, in keeping with the language of the Talmud.

And you must conceive and reflect upon all of it in your thought in the straightforward form; namely, you must recognize and discern what the intended statement is and what the proof for it is, and what the proofs of the proof are — and likewise to the end.

There is also the elucidation of statements; namely, that one thing is said briefly or by allusion, and afterward it is elucidated at greater length.

Now the elucidation is nothing other than the first thing itself; however, it is in a more expansive manner than the first. And this too you must discern: what is a statement and what is an elucidation.

For example, a statement — when you have found that they said (Shabbat 5): "Where do we find a case like this in which one is liable? Rav Safra said, R. Ami said, R. Yochanan said: It is just as with (מדי דהוה) one who carries an object in the public domain; there, is it not [so] that although as long as he holds it and walks he is exempt, when he sets it down he is liable? So too, it is no different."

And they raised a further difficulty: "Is it comparable (מי דמי)? There, wherever he sets it down is a place of liability; here, if he sets it down in the colonnade, it is a place of exemption."

Now at the outset the statement was that one who carries out from a shop to the public square by way of a colonnade is liable.

And the Gemara raised a difficulty against this by saying: "Where do we find a case like this in which one is liable?"

Its intent: this one who carries out from a shop to the public square by way of a colonnade — it stands to reason that he should not be liable; and this is because the one who carries out from domain to domain who is liable is one who carries out from the private domain to the public domain, or the reverse, and there is no matter of exemption between the lifting and the setting down; but when there is an intervening exemption between the lifting and the setting down, we have no ground for him to be liable.

Now there is included in this a statement, and a proof for it, and a proof for the proof; for the intent of "Where do we find, etc." is that we have not found one who carries out from domain to domain such as this who is liable; and it is understood from this that, if so, the meaning of "one who carries out from domain to domain" is not [a case] such as this, but rather one who carries out from domain to domain without any intervening exemption at all; and from this we derive that this carrier ought not to be liable.

However, you should conceive all this in your thought in the simple, straightforward form, namely: one who carries out from a shop to the public square by way of a colonnade — we cannot hold him liable;

and the proof for this: if we do not find explicitly that one who carries out from domain to domain with an interruption of a matter of exemption in the middle is liable, we cannot hold him liable; in truth, we do not find explicitly that one who carries out, etc.; [therefore] we cannot hold him liable.

For whatever is not within the primary understanding of one of the laws, we may not bring it into that class unless we have clear proof for this; one who carries out from domain to domain with an interruption of exemption in the middle is not within the primary understanding of "one who carries out from domain to domain"; if so, we may not bring it into that class unless we have clear proof, namely, we cannot hold him liable.

The premise that "whatever is not within the primary understanding [of one of the laws, etc.]," and likewise the second, that "one who carries out from domain to domain with an interruption of a matter of exemption in the middle is not within the primary understanding, etc.," do not require any other proof, for they are among the intelligibles.

We thereby learn: one who carries out from domain to domain with an interruption of exemption in the middle — we cannot hold him liable; one who carries out to the public square by way of a colonnade is one who carries out from domain to domain with an interruption of exemption in the middle; if so, we cannot hold him liable.

Now all of this you can gather into a single chain, in which you will find all the premises linked one to another before you until the sought conclusion emerges, and you will say:

one who carries out from a shop to the public square by way of a colonnade is one who carries out from domain to domain with an interruption of exemption (in the middle; one who carries out from domain to domain with an interruption of exemption) in the middle is not within the primary understanding of "one who carries out from domain to domain," and also we have no proof that it is included in it; that which is not within the primary understanding of "one who carries out from domain to domain," and there is no proof that it is included in it — we cannot hold him liable on its account; if so, one who carries out from a shop to the public square by way of a colonnade — we cannot hold him liable on account of "one who carries out from domain to domain."

Afterward they answered this: "It is just as with one who carries an object," etc. The intent of this is that it is fitting that one who carries out from domain to domain with an interruption of exemption should be liable — the opposite of what we had thought, [that] it is fitting that he should not be liable.

A proof for this: "one who carries [an object] four cubits in the public domain [is liable]"; and the elucidation of this: one who carries in the public domain — between the lifting and the setting down there is a matter of exemption, which is the whole time that he is carrying it along, and afterward, when he sets it down, he becomes liable; if so, we can likewise say that there should be liability, even though the passage by way of the colonnade is in the middle.

It thus turns out that there is here a statement, a proof, and an elucidation. The statement is that one who carries out from domain to domain with an interruption of exemption is liable.

The proof for this, by force of a similarity: one who carries out from domain to domain is similar to one who carries in the public domain; one who carries in the public domain is liable, even though there is an interruption of exemption between lifting and setting down; if so, so too one who carries out from domain to domain.

The elucidation of the premise that one who carries in the public domain has in his case an interruption of exemption, etc.: that the whole time he is walking, he is exempt.

You see how brief the language of the sages is, and how much reflection is included in it;

however, all this must be conceived in your intellect by force of those words, for if any part of this is lacking from your conception, then you will not have conceived what they intended to say.

What you must further reflect upon is to recognize the synonymous nouns that have been explained by the grammarians, and likewise the synonymous statements, namely, those whose words are different and whose matter is one.

For it sometimes happens that two statements contradict one another or demonstrate one another, and the intellect does not perceive this at the beginning of its reflection, because their subjects or their matters are mentioned in different words even though they are truly one, or the order of their words differs.

However, when one looks at them well and apprehends the sum of their intent, one will find that they are truly related to one another.

For example, if one says: "Things consecrated to the altar have no redemption," and another says: "The sacrifices have redemption" — the two statements are certainly opposites.

Likewise, when one says: "The liquids of the altar precinct [in the Temple] are pure," and another says: "The oil, the blood, the wine, and the water are pure" — the two statements are equivalent, for one mentioned the genus and the other mentioned the species. And so with everything of the like.

Now, you must scrutinize each and every utterance to see which of the parts of the sugyot it is — as I set out before you above.

And it turns out that sometimes two of the parts are compounded together.

For example: when the report of one of the sages, who reports an incident that occurred or a statement that was made, is brought as proof for a statement that was made, you will discern there two parts compounded together, namely demonstration and report — for we demonstrate the statement by the force of the report that he reported.

And you must first understand the report on its own, and afterwards understand the demonstration, that is, how that report serves as a demonstration for the statement we wish to demonstrate.

It is quite possible that the demonstration is rebutted and a difficulty is raised against it, and not on that account is a difficulty raised against the report; rather, it is shown that this report does not demonstrate the statement that we thought to demonstrate from it.

And it is possible that the report itself is disproved and a difficulty is raised against it, even while we concede the first statement.

And it is possible that we concede even the demonstration and nevertheless raise a difficulty against the report, concerning its words or concerning some matter in it.

Likewise, when one of the sages wishes to explain an argument that a certain sage felt in one of his own statements, he will mention that difficulty, which arose according to the opinion of the sage who is the author of the statement, and this is called an ascribed difficulty (kushya muggedet, a reported difficulty) —

for it is not a difficulty that that sage raises against his colleague's statement; rather, this sage reports what was difficult for his colleague.

And it may well happen that the very sage who reported the difficulty does not agree with it.

And it is possible that another questioner raises a difficulty against the reporter concerning his report, because it appears to him impossible that the author of the statement intended what he [the reporter] supposed — and not on that account is his difficulty rebutted; rather, his report is disproved.

And it is possible that a questioner raises a difficulty against the very difficulty that the reporter reported, and rebuts it.

Likewise, it is possible that he raises a difficulty against the report or against the difficulty, and does not on that account enter into the first statement, neither to verify it nor to falsify it.

Therefore you must reflect very carefully so as to distinguish between what a speaker says from his own mind and what a reporter reports from another.

For example, when they said in the Talmud: "What is [meant by] 'if you wish to say'?" (מאי אם נפשך לומר), and he answered: "Further, it was difficult for the Tanna" etc. — this is an ascribed difficulty, in that the reporter reported that the Tanna felt this difficulty against his own words;

and they raised the difficulty: "They say: one derives…" etc. — this is a difficulty against the reporter's report, showing that it is impossible that this was the intention of the Tanna which he [the reporter] explained in his report.

And in all these things you must guard yourself very carefully, so that you may be clear of errors and confusions.

Now, after you have apprehended the intent of the sugya before you according to all these general rules, you should then return to reflect upon each of its parts;

and if it appears to you that all of them stand within their proper limits according to the natural rules that I mentioned above — that is very good;

but if it appears to you that in one of the parts the limit proper to it is not observed — then you must toil and labor until you find for it the fitting and proper settlement, one that accords with the wording before you and accords with what is verified or commonly accepted.